{"id":1147,"date":"2013-07-13T01:32:54","date_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:32:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/?p=1147"},"modified":"2013-07-13T01:32:54","modified_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:32:54","slug":"56-the-principle-of-free-confederation-vol-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/01-works-of-sri-aurobindo\/01-sabcl\/15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15\/56-the-principle-of-free-confederation-vol-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","title":{"rendered":"-56_The Principle of Free Confederation.htm"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n
\n
\n


\nCHAPTER <\/font><\/b>
\nXXX<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nThe
\nPrinciple of Free Confederation<\/span><\/font><\/b><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0            
\n<\/font> <\/span>
\nTHE issues of
\nthe original Russian idea of a confederation of free self-determining
\nnationalities were greatly complicated by the transitory phenomenon of a
\nrevolution which has sought, like the French Revolution before it, to transform
\nimmediately and without easy intermediate stages the whole basis not only of
\ngovernment, but of society, and has, moreover, been carried out under pressure
\nof a disastrous war. This double situation led inevitably to an unexampled
\nanarchy and, incidentally, to the forceful domination of art extreme party
\nwhich represented the ideas of the Revolution in their most uncompromising and
\nviolent form. The Bolshevik despotism corresponds in this respect to the
\nJacobin despotism of the French Reign of Terror. The latter lasted long enough
\nto secure its work, which was to effect violently and irrevocably the
\ntransition from the post-feudal system of society to the first middle- class
\nbasis of democratic development. The Labourite despotism in Russia, the rule of
\nthe Soviets, fixing its hold and lasting long enough, could effect the
\ntransition of society to a second and more advanced basis of the same or even
\nto a still farther development. But we are concerned only with the effect on
\nthe ideal of free nationality. On this point, all Russia, except the small
\nreactionary party, was from the first agreed; but the resort to the principle
\nof government by force brought in a contradictory element which endangered its
\nsound effectuation even in Russia itself and therefore weakened the force which
\nit might have had in the immediate future of the world-development.1<\/sup>
\n <\/span>For
\nit stands on a moral principle which belongs to the future; while government of
\nother nations by force belongs to the past and present<\/font><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n1<\/sup> <\/font>The component States of Sovietic Russia are
\nallowed a certain cultural, linguistic and other autonomy, but the rest is
\nillusory as they are, in fact, governed by the force of a highly centralised
\nautocracy in Moscow<\/span>.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-510<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nand is radically inconsistent with the founding of the
\nnew world arrangement on the basis of free choice and free status’. It must
\ntherefore be considered in itself apart from any application now received,
\nwhich must necessarily be curbed. and imperfect.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The
\npolitical arrangement of the world hitherto has rested on an almost entirely
\nphysical and vital, that is to say, geographical, commercial, political and
\nmilitary basis. Both the nation idea and the State idea have been built and
\nhave worked on this foundation. The first unity aimed at has been a
\ngeographical, commercial, political and military union, and in establishing
\nthis unity, the earlier vital principle ‘of race on which the clan and tribe
\nwere founded, has been everywhere overridden. It is true that nationhood still
\nfounds itself largely on the idea of race, but this is in the nature of a
\nfiction. It covers the historical fact of a fusion of many races and attributes
\na natural motive to a historical and geographical association. Nationhood
\nfounds itself partly on this association, partly on others which accentuate it,
\ncommon interests, community of language, community of culture and all these in
\nunison have evolved a psychological idea, a psychological unity, which finds
\nexpression in the idea of nationalism. But the nation idea and the State idea
\ndo not everywhere coincide, and in most cases the former has been overridden by
\nthe latter and always on the same physical and vital grounds – grounds of
\ngeographical, political and military necessity or convenience. In the conflict
\nbetween the two, force, as in all vital and physical struggle, must always be
\nthe final arbiter. But the new principle proposed,1<\/sup> \u00a0<\/span>that of the right of every natural grouping
\nwhich feels its own separateness to choose its own status and partnerships,
\nmakes a clean sweep of these vital and physical grounds and substitutes a
\npurely psychological principle of free-will and free choice as against the
\nclaims of political and economic necessity. Or rather the vital and physical
\ngrounds of grouping are only to be held valid when they receive this
\npsychological sanction and are to found themselves upon it.<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n


\n1 <\/font><\/sup>This principle was recognised in theory by the Allies under the name of
\nself-determination but, needless to say, it has been disregarded as soon as the
\ncry had served its turn<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-511<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nHow the two rival principles work out, can be seen by
\nthe example of Russia itself which is now prominently before our eyes. Russia
\nhas never been a nation-State, in the pure sense of the word, like France,
\nSpain, Italy, Great Britain or modern Germany; it has been a congeries of
\nnations, Great Russia, Ruthenian Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania, Poland,
\nSiberia, all Slavic with a dash of Tartar and German blood, Courland which is
\nmostly Slav but partly German, Finland, which has no community of any kind with
\nthe rest of Russia, and latterly the Asiatic nations of Turkistan, all bound
\ntogether by one bond only, the rule of the Tsar. The only psychological
\njustification of such a union was the future possibility of fusion into a
\nsingle nation with the Russian language as its instrument of culture, thought
\nand government, and it was this which the old Russian regime had in view. The
\nonly way to bring this about was by governmental force, the way that had been
\nlong attempted by England in Ireland and as attempted by Germany in German
\nPoland and Lorraine. The Austrian method of federation employed with Hungary as
\na second partner or of a pressure tempered by leniency, by concessions and by
\nmeasures of administrative half-autonomy, might have been tried, but their
\nsuccess in Austria has been small. Federation has not as yet proved a
\nsuccessful principle except between States and nations or sub- nations already
\ndisposed to unite by ties of common culture, a common past or an already
\ndeveloped or developing sense of common nationhood; such conditions existed in
\nthe American States and in Germany and they exist in China and in India, but
\nthey have not existed in Austria or Russia. Or, if things and ideas had been
\nripe, instead of this attempt, there might have been an endeavour to found a
\nfree union of nations with the Tsar as the symbol of a supranational idea and
\nbond of unity; but for this the movement of the world was not yet ready.
\nAgainst an obstinate psychological resistance the vital and physical motive of
\nunion could only resort to force, military, administrative and political, which
\nhas succeeded often enough in the past. In Russia, it was probably on the way
\nto a slow success as far as the Slavic portions of the Empire were concerned;
\nin Finland, perhaps also in Poland, it would probably have failed much more
\nirretrievably<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\nPage-512<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nthan the long reign of force failed in Ireland, partly
\nbecause even, a Russian or a German autocracy cannot apply perfectly and simply
\nthe large, thorough-going and utterly brutal and predatory methods of a
\nCromwell or Elizabeth,1 <\/sup>partly because the resisting psychological factor of
\nnationalism had become too self- conscious and capable of an organised passive
\nresistance or at least a passive force of survival.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>But if the
\npsychological justification was deficient or only in process of creation, the
\nvital and physical case for a strictly united Russia, not excluding Finland,
\nwas overwhelming. The work of the Peters and Catherines was founded on a strong
\npolitical, military and economic necessity. From the political and military
\npoint of view, all these Slavic nations had every- thing to lose by disunion,
\nbecause, disunited, they were each ex- posed and they exposed each other to the
\noppressive contact of any powerful neighbour, Sweden, Turkey, Poland, while
\nPoland was a hostile and powerful State, or Germany and Austria. The union of
\nthe Ukraine Cossacks with Russia was indeed brought about by mutual agreement
\nas a measure of defence against Poland. Poland itself, once weakened, stood a
\nbetter chance by being united with Russia than by standing helpless and alone
\nbetween three large and powerful neighbours, and her total inclusion would
\ncertainly have been a better solution for her than the fatal partition between
\nthree hungry Powers. On the other hand, by union a State was created, so
\ngeographically compact, yet so large in bulk, numerous in population, well
\ndefended by natural conditions and rich in potential resources that, if it had
\nbeen properly organised, it could not only have stood secure in itself, but
\ndominated half Asia, as it already does, and half Europe, as it was once, even
\nwithout proper organisation and development, almost on the way to do, when it
\ninterfered as armed arbiter, here deliverer, there champion of oppression in
\nAustro-Hungary and in the Balkans. Even the assimilation of Finland was
\njustified from this point of view; for a free<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n1<\/sup> <\/font>This could no longer be said after the revival of
\nmediaeval barbaric cruelty in Nazi Germany, one of the most striking recent
\ndevelopments of "modern" humanity. But this may be regarded perhaps
\nas a temporary backsliding, though it sheds lurid lights on the still existing
\ndarker possibilities of human nature<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-513<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nFinland would have left Russia geographically and,
\neconomically incomplete and beset and limited in her narrow Baltic outlet,
\nwhile a Finland dominated by a strong Sweden or a powerful Germany would have
\nbeen a standing military menace to the Russian capital and the Russian empire.
\nThe inclusion of Fin- land, on the contrary, made Russia secure, at ease and
\npowerful at this vital point. Nor, might it be argued, did Finland herself
\nreally lose, since, independent, she would be too small and weak to maintain
\nherself against neighbouring imperial aggressiveness and must rely on the
\nsupport of Russia. All these advantages have been destroyed, temporarily at
\nleast, by the centrifugal forces let loose by the Revolution and its principle
\nof the free choice of nationalities.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>It is
\nevident that these arguments, founded as they are on vital and physical
\nnecessity and regardless of moral and psycho- logical justification, might
\n"be carried very far. They would not only justify Austria’s now past
\ndomination of Trieste and her Slavic territories, as they justified England’s
\nconquest and holding of Ireland against the continued resistance of the Irish
\npeople, but also, extended a little farther, Germany’s scheme of Pan-Germanism
\nand even her larger ideas of absorption and expansion. It could be extended to
\nvalidate all that imperial expansion of the European nations which has now no
\nmoral justification and could only have been justified morally in the future by
\nthe creation of supranational psychological unities; for the vital and physical
\ngrounds always exist. Even the moral, at least the psychological and cultural
\njustification of a unified Russian culture and life in process of creation,
\ncould be extended, and the European claim to spread and universalise European
\ncivilisation by annexation and governmental force presents on its larger scale
\na certain moral analogy. This, too, extended, might justify the pre-war German
\nideal of a sort of unification of the world under the aegis of German power and
\nGerman culture. But, however liable to abuse by extension, vital necessity must
\nbe allowed a word in a world still dominated fundamentally by the law of force,
\nhowever mitigated in its application, and by vital and physical necessity, so
\nfar at least as concerns natural geographical unities like Russia, the<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-514<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nUnited Kingdom,1<\/sup> even Austria within its natural
\nfrontiers.2<\/sup><\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The Russian
\nprinciple belongs, in fact, to a possible future in which moral and
\npsychological principles will have a real chance to dominate, and vital and
\nphysical necessities will have to suit themselves to them, instead of, as now,
\nthe other way round; it belongs to an arrangement of things that would be the
\nexact reverse of the present international system. As things are at present, it
\nhas to struggle against difficulties which may well be insuperable. The
\nRussians were much ridiculed and more vilified for their offer of a democratic
\npeace founded on the free choice of nations to autocratic and militarist
\nGermany bent on expansion like other empires by dishonest diplomacy and by the
\nsword. From the point of view of practical statesmanship the ridicule was
\njustified; for the offer ignored facts and forces and founded itself on the
\npower of the naked and unarmed idea. The Russians, thorough-going idealists,
\nacted, in fact, in the same spirit as did once the French in the first fervour
\nof their revolutionary enthusiasm; they offered their new principle of liberty
\nand democratic peace to the world, – not, at first, to Germany alone, –<\/span> in the hope that its moral beauty
\nand truth and inspiration would compel acceptance, not by the Governments but
\nby the peoples who would force the hands of the Governments or overturn them if
\nthey opposed. Like the French Revolutionists, they found that ours is still a
\nworld in which ideals can only be imposed if they have a preponderating vital
\nand physical force in their hands or at their backs. The French Jacobins with
\ntheir ideal of unitarian nationalism were able to concentrate their energies
\nand make their principle triumph for a time by force of arms against a hostile
\nworld. The Russian idealists found in their attempt to effectuate their
\nprinciple that the principle itself was a source of weakness; they found
\nthemselves helpless against the hard- headed German cynicism, not because they
\nwere disorganised, – for revolutionary France was also disorganised and
\novercame the difficulty, –<\/span> but
\nbecause the dissolution of the old Russian<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n


\n1 <\/font><\/sup>
\nNow we must say Great
\nBritain and Ireland, for the United Kingdom exists no longer<\/font><\/span>)<\/font><\/span> even Austria within its natural
\nfrontiers. (<\/font>Note from this point of view the disastrous economic results of the
\nbreaking up of the Austrian empire in the small nations that have arisen in its
\nplace<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/p>\n

\n2<\/sup> Note from this point of view the disastrous economic
\nresults of the breaking up of the Austrian empire in the small nations that have
\narisen in its place.<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-515<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nfabric to which they had consented deprived them of the
\nmeans of united and organised action. Nevertheless, their principle was a more
\nadvanced, because a moral principle, than the aggressive nationalism which was
\nall the international result of the French Revolution; it has a greater meaning
\nfor the future.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>For it
\nbelongs to a future of free world-union in which precisely this principle of
\nfree self-determination must be either the preliminary movement or the main final
\nresult, to an arrangement of things in which the world will have done with war
\nand force as the ultimate basis of national and international relations and be
\nready to adopt free agreement as a substitute. If the idea could work itself
\nout, even if only within the bounds of Russia,1<\/sup>
\n <\/span>and arrive at some
\nprinciple of common action, even at the cost of that aggressive force which
\nnational centralisation can alone give, it would mean a new moral power in the
\nworld. It would certainly not be accepted elsewhere, except in case of
\nunexpected revolutions, without enormous reserves and qualifications; but it
\nwould be there working as a power to make the world ready for itself and, when
\nit is ready, would playa large determining part in the final arrangement of
\nhuman unity. But even if it fails entirely in its present push for realisation,
\nit will still have its part to play in a better prepared future.<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n1<\/sup> <\/font>The idea was sincere at the time, but it has lost its significance
\nbecause of the principle <\/span>of
\nrevolutionary force on which Sovietism still rests<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-516<\/font><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CHAPTER XXX The Principle of Free Confederation   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0             THE issues of the original Russian idea of a confederation of free self-determining nationalities were greatly…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1147","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","wpcat-25-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1147","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1147"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1147\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1147"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1147"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1147"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}