{"id":1178,"date":"2013-07-13T01:33:06","date_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:33:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/?p=1178"},"modified":"2013-07-13T01:33:06","modified_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:33:06","slug":"49-forms-of-government-vol-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/01-works-of-sri-aurobindo\/01-sabcl\/15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15\/49-forms-of-government-vol-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","title":{"rendered":"-49_Forms of Government.htm"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n
\n
\n

CHAPTER <\/font><\/b>XXIII<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nForms of
\nGovernment<\/font><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t
\n\t\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span><\/font><\/span>            T<\/font><\/span>HE idea of a world-union of free
\nnations and empires, loose at first, but growing closer-knit with time and
\nexperience, seems at first sight the most practicable form of political unity;
\nit is the only form indeed which would be immediately practicable, supposing
\nthe will to unity to become rapidly effective in the mind of the race. On the
\nother hand, it is the State idea which is now dominant. The State has been the
\nmost successful and efficient means of unification and has been best able to
\nmeet the various needs which the progressive aggregate life of societies has
\ncreated for itself and is still creating. It is, besides, the expedient to
\nwhich the human mind at present has grown accustomed, and it is too the most
\nready means both for its logical and its practical reason to work with because
\nit provides it with what our limited intelligence is always tempted to think
\nits best instrument, a clear-cut and precise machinery and a stringent method
\nof organisation. Therefore it is by no means impossible that, even though
\nbeginning with a loose union, the nations may be rapidly moved by the pressure
\nof the many problems which would arise from the ever closer interworking of
\ntheir needs and interests, to convert it into the more stringent form of a
\nWorld-State. We can found no safe conclusion upon the immediate
\nimpracticability of its creation or on the many difficulties which would stand
\nin its way; for past experience shows that the argument of impracticability is
\nof very little value. What the practical man of today denies as absurd and
\nimpracticable is often enough precisely the thing that future generations set
\nabout realising and eventually in some form or other succeed in bringing into
\neffective existence.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>But a
\nWorld-State implies a strong central organ of power that would represent or at
\nleast stand for the united will of the nations. A unification of all the
\nnecessary powers in the hands<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-443<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nof this central and common governing body, at least in
\ntheir source – powers military, administrative, judicial, economic,
\nlegislative, social, educational would be indispensable. And as an almost
\ninevitable result there would be an increasing uniformity of human life
\nthroughout the world in all these departments, even perhaps to the choice or
\ncreation of one common and universal language. This, indeed, is the dream of a
\nunified world which Utopian thinkers have been more and more moved to place
\nbefore us. The difficulties in the way of arriving at this result are at
\npresent obvious, but they are perhaps not so great as they seem at first sight
\nand none of them are insoluble. It is no longer a Utopia that can be put aside
\nas the impracticable dream of the ideal thinker.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The first
\ndifficulty would be the character and composition of this governing body, a
\nproblem beset with doubts and perils. In ancient times it was solved readily enough
\nin smaller limits by the absolutist and monarchical solution with the rule of a
\nconquering race as the starting-point, as in the Persian and Roman empires. But
\nthat resource is no longer as easily open to us in the new conditions of human
\nsociety, whatever dreams may in the past have entered into the minds of
\npowerful nations or their Czars and Kaisers. The monarchical idea itself is
\nbeginning to pass away after a brief and fallacious attempt at persistence and
\nrevival. Almost it seems to be nearing its final agony; the seal of the night
\nis upon it. Contemporary appearances are often enough deceptive, but they are
\nless likely to be so in the present instance than in many others, because the
\nforce which makes for the disappearance of the still-surviving monarchies is
\nstrong, radical and ever increasing. The social aggregates have ripened into
\nself- conscious maturity and no longer stand in need of a hereditary kingship
\nto do their governing work for them or even to stand for them – except perhaps
\nin certain exceptional cases such as the British Empire – as the symbol of
\ntheir unity. Either then the monarchy can only survive in name, – as in England
\nwhere the king has less power even, if that be possible, than the French
\nPresident and infinitely less than the heads of the American re- publics, – or
\nelse it becomes a source of offence, a restraint to the growing democratic
\nspirit of the peoples and to a greater or<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-444<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\u00a0<\/font><\/span>less<\/font><\/span> degree<\/span> a centre, a refuge or at least an opportunity for the forces<\/span> of reaction. Its prestige and
\npopularity tend therefore not to increase but to decline, and at some crisis
\nwhen it comes too strongly into conflict with the sentiment of the nation, it
\nfalls with the small chance of lasting revival.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>Monarchy
\nhas thus fallen or is threatened almost everywhere – and most suddenly in
\ncountries where its tradition was once<\/span>
\nthe strongest. Even in these days it has fallen in Germany and Austria, in
\nChina, in Portugal, in Russia; it has been in peril in Greece and Italy;1<\/sup> and it has been cast out of Spain. In no
\ncontinental country is it really safe except in some of the smaller States. In
\nmost of them it exists for reasons that already belong to the past and may soon
\nlose, if they are not already losing, their force. The continent of Europe
\nseems destined to become in time as universally republican as the two Americas.
\nFor kingship there is now only a survival of the world’s past; it has no deep
\nroot in the practical needs or the ideals or the temperament of present-day
\nhumanity. When it disappears, it will be truer to say of it that it has ceased
\nto survive than to say that it <\/font>
\nhas
\nceased to live.<\/font> <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The
\nrepublican tendency is indeed Western in its origin, stronger as we go more and
\nmore to the West, and has been historically powerful chiefly in Western Europe
\nand dominant in the new societies of America. It might be thought that with the
\nentrance of Asia into the active united life of the world, when the eastern
\ncontinent has passed through its present throes of transition, the monarchical
\nidea might recover strength and find a new source of life. For in Asia kingship
\nhas been not only a material fact resting upon political needs and conditions,
\nbut a spiritual symbol and invested with a sacrosanct character. But in Asia no
\nless than in Europe, monarchy has been a historical growth, the result of
\ncircumstances and therefore subject to disappearance when those circumstances
\nno longer exist. The true mind of Asia has always remained, behind all surface
\nappearances, not political but social, monarchical and aristocratic at the
\nsurface but with a fundamental democratic trend and a theocratic spirit. Japan
\nwith its deep-rooted monarchic sentiment is <\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n


\n\t1 <\/font><\/sup>Now in Italy too it is gone with
\npracticaIly no hope of return.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

Page-445<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nthe one prominent exception to this general rule.
\nAlready a great tendency of <\/i>change is manifest. China, always a
\ndemocratic country at bottom though admitting in its democratic system an
\nofficial aristocracy of <\/i>intellect and a symbolic imperial head, is now
\ndefinitely republican. The difficulty of <\/i>the attempt to revive monarchy
\nor to replace it by temporary dictatorships has been due to an innate
\ndemocratic sentiment now invigorated by the acceptance of <\/i>a democratic
\nform for the supreme government, the one valuable contribution of <\/i>Western
\nexperience to the problem at which the old purely social democracies of <\/i>the
\nEast were unable to arrive. In breaking with the last of <\/i>its long
\nsuccession of <\/i>dynasties China had broken with an element of <\/i>her
\npast which was rather superficial than at the very centre of <\/i>her social
\ntemperament and habits. In India the monarchical sentiment, which coexisted
\nwith but was never able to prevail over the theocratic and social except during
\nthe comparatively brief rule of <\/i>the Moghuls, was hopelessly weakened
\nthough not effaced, by the rule of <\/i>a British bureaucracy and the
\npolitical Europeanising of <\/i>the active mind of <\/i>the race.1<\/sup>
\n <\/span>In Western Asia monarchy has disappeared in Turkey, it exists
\nonly in the States which need the monarch as a centralising power or keystone.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>At the two
\nextremes of <\/i>the Asiatic world in Japan and in Turkey the monarchy after
\nthe close of <\/i>the war still preserved something of <\/i>its old
\nsacrosanct character and its appeal to the sentiment of <\/i>the race. In
\nJapan, still imperfectly democratised, the sentiment which surrounds the Mikado
\nis visibly weakened, his prestige survives but his actual power is very
\nlimited, and the growth of <\/i>democracy and socialism is bound to aid the
\nweakening and limiting process and may well produce the same results as in
\nEurope. The Moslem Caliphate; originally the head of <\/i>a theocratic
\ndemocracy, was converted into a political institution by the rapid growth of
\n<\/i>a Moslem empire, now broken into pieces. The Caliphate now abolished could
\nonly have survived as a purely religious headship and even in that character
\nits unity was threat-<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n


\n\t1 <\/font><\/sup>
\nNow with the liberation of <\/i>the
\ncountry and the establishment of <\/i>a republican and democratic
\nconstitution, the ruling princes have either disappeared or become subordinate
\nheads with their small kingdoms becoming partly or wholly democratised or
\ndestined to melt into a united India<\/span>.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-446<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n


\nened by the<\/font><\/span>
\nrise of new spiritual and national movements in Persia, Arabia and Egypt. But
\nthe one real and important fact in Asia of<\/span>
\ntoday<\/span> is this that the whole
\nactive force of its future is centred not in priesthood or aristocracy, but, as
\nit was formerly in Russia before<\/span>
\nthe Revolution, in a newly-created intelligentsia, small at first in numbers,
\nbut increasing in energy and the settled will to arrive and bound to become
\nexceedingly dynamic by reason of [the inherited force of spirituality. Asia may
\nwell preserve its ancient spirituality; even in its hour of greatest weakness
\nit has been able to impose its prestige increasingly even on the\u00a0 <\/span>positive European mind. But whatever turn
\nthat spirituality takes, it will be determined by the mentality of this new
\nintelligentsia and will certainly flow into other channels than the old\u00a0 <\/span>ideas and symbols. The old forms of Asiatic
\nmonarchy and theocracy seem therefore destined to disappear; at present there
\nis no chance of their revival in new figures, although that may happen in the
\nfuture.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The only
\napparent chance eventually for the monarchical idea<\/span> is that its form may be retained as a convenient symbol for
\nthe unity of the heterogeneous empires which would be the largest elements in
\nany unification based upon the present political con- figuration of the world.
\nBut even for these empires the symbol has not proved to be indispensable.
\nFrance has done without it, Russia has recently dispensed with it. In Austria
\nit had become odious to some of the constituent races as the badge of
\nsubjection and was bound to perish even without the collapse of the Great War.<\/span> Only in England and in some small
\ncountries is it at once innocuous and useful and therefore upheld by a general
\nfeeling. Conceivably, if the British Empire,1<\/sup> ()<\/span> even now the leading, the most influential, the most powerful
\nforce in the world, were to become<\/span>
\nthe nucleus or the pattern of the future unification, there might be some
\nchance of the monarchical element surviving in the figure –<\/span> and even an empty figure is
\nsometimes useful as a support and centre for future potentialities to grow and
\nfill with life. But against this stands the fixed republican sentiment of the
\nwhole of America and the increasing spread of the republican form; there is
\nlittle chance that even a nominal kingship re-<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n


\n\t1 <\/font><\/sup>Now no longer Empire but Commonwealth<\/span>.<\/span><\/font>  <\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-447<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\npresenting one element of a very heterogeneous whole
\nwould be accepted by the rest in any form of general unification. In the past,
\nat least, this has only happened under the stress of conquest. Even if the
\nWorld-State found it convenient as the result of experience to introduce or to
\nreintroduce the monarchical element into its constitution, it could only be in
\nsome quite new form of a democratic kingship. But a democratic kingship, as
\nopposed to a passive figure of monarchy, the modern world has not succeeded in
\nevolving.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The two
\ndetermining facts in modem conditions which alter the whole problem are that in
\nthis kind of unification nations take the place of individuals and that these
\nnations are mature selfconscious societies, predestined therefore to pass
\nthrough pronounced forms of social democracy or some other form of socialism.
\nIt is reasonable to suppose that the World-State will tend to strive after the
\nsame principle of formation as that which obtains in the separate societies
\nwhich are to constitute it. The problem would be simpler if we could suppose
\nthe difficulties created by conflicting national temperaments, interests and
\ncultures to be either eliminated or successfully subordinated and minimised by
\nthe depression of separative nationalistic feeling and the growth of a
\ncosmopolitan internationalism. That solution is not altogether impossible in
\nspite of the serious check to internationalism and the strong growth. of
\nnationalistic feeling developed by the World War. For, conceivably,
\ninternationalism may revive with a redoubled force after the stress of the
\nfeelings created by the War has passed. In that case, the tendency of
\nunification may look to the ideal of a world-wide Republic with the nations as
\nprovinces, though at first very sharply distinct provinces, and governed by a
\ncouncil or parliament responsible to the united democracies of the world. Or it
\nmight be something like the disguised oligarchy of an international council
\nreposing its rule on the assent, expressed by election or otherwise, of what
\nmight be called a semi-passive democracy as its first figure. For that is what
\nthe modem democracy at present is in fact; the sole democratic elements are
\npublic opinion, periodical elections and the power of the people to refuse
\nre-election to those who have displeased it. The government is really in the
\nhands of the bour-<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-448<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\ngeoisie, the professional and business men, the
\nlandholders, – <\/span>where such a
\nclass still exists, – strengthened by a number of new arrivals<\/span> from the working-class who very soon assimilate
\nthemselves to the political temperament and ideas of the governing classes.1<\/sup> <\/font>
\n <\/font><\/span>If a World-State were to be established on the present basis of human
\nsociety, it might well try to develop its central government on this principle.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>But the
\npresent is a moment of transition and a bourgeois World-State is not a probable
\nconsummation. In each of the more progressive nations, the dominance of the
\nmiddle class is threatened on two sides. There is first the dissatisfaction of
\nthe intellectuals who find in its unimaginative business practicality and
\nobstinate commercialism an obstacle to the realisation of their ideals. And
\nthere is the dissatisfaction of the great and growing power of Labour which
\nsees democratic ideals and changes continually exploited in the interests of
\nthe middle class, though as yet it has found no alternative to the
\nParliamentarism by which that class ensures its rule.2<\/sup> (<\/font>)<\/font><\/span> What changes the alliance between
\nthese two dissatisfactions may bring about, it is impossible to foresee. In
\nRussia, where it was strongest, we have seen it taking the lead of the
\nRevolution and compelling the bourgeoisie to undergo its control, although the
\ncompromise so effected could not long outlast the exigencies of the war. Since
\nthen the old order there has been "liquidated" and the triumph of the new
\ntendencies has been complete. In two directions it may lead to a new form of
\nmodified oligarchy with a democratic basis. The government of a modern society
\nis now growing an exceedingly complicated business in each part of which a
\nspecial knowledge, special competence, special faculties are required and every<\/span>
\nnew step towards State socialism must increase this tendency. The need of this
\nsort of special training or faculty in the councillor and administrator
\ncombined with the democratic tendencies of the age might well lead to some
\nmodern form of the old Chinese principle of government, a democratic organisa-
\n<\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n


\n\t1 <\/font><\/sup>This
\nhas now changed and the Trade Unions and similar institutions have attained an
\nequal power with the other classes<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n\t2 <\/font>
\n\tWritten before
\nthe emergence of the Soviet State in Russia and of the Fascist States. In the
\nlatter it is the middle class itself that rose against democracy and
\nestablished for a time a new form of government and society<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-449<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\ntion of life below, above the rule of a sort of
\nintellectual bureaucracy, an official aristocracy of special knowledge and
\ncapacity recruited from the general body without distinction of classes. Equal
\nopportunity would be indispensable but this governing elite would still form a
\nclass by itself in the constitution of the society. On the other hand, if the
\nindustrialism of the modern nations changes, as some think it will, and
\ndevelops into a sort of guild socialism, a guild aristocracy of Labour might
\nwell become the governing body in the society.1<\/sup> \u00a0<\/span>If any of these things were done, any
\nmovement towards a World-State would then take the same direction and evolve a
\ngoverning body of the same model. But in these two possibilities we leave out
\nof consideration the great factor of nationalism and the conflicting interests
\nand tendencies it creates. To overcome these conflicting interests, it has been
\nsupposed, the best way is to evolve a sort of World- Parliament in which, it is
\nto be presumed, the freely formed and freely expressed opinion of the majority
\nwould prevail. Parliamentarism, the invention of the English political genius,
\nis a necessary stage in the evolution of democracy, for without it the
\ngeneralised faculty of considering and managing with the least possible
\nfriction large problems of politics, administration, economics, legislation
\nconcerning considerable aggregates of men cannot easily be developed. It has
\nalso been the one successful means yet discovered of preventing the State
\nexecutive from suppressing the liberties of the individual and the nation.
\nNations emerging into the modern form of society are therefore naturally and
\nrightly attracted to this instrument of government. But it has not yet been
\nfound possible to combine Parliamentarism and the modem trend towards a more
\ndemocratic democracy; it has been always an instrument either of a modified
\naristocratic or of a middle class rule. Besides, its method involves an immense
\nwaste of time and energy and a confused, swaying and uncertain action that
\n"muddle out" in the end some tolerable result. This method accords
\nill with the more stringent ideas of<\/font><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n1 <\/font><\/sup>
\nSomething of the kind was attempted in Soviet Russia for a time. The
\nexisting conditions were not favourable and a definite form of government not
\nrevolutionary and provisional is not anywhere in sight. In Fascist Italy a
\nco-operative State was announced but this too took no effectual or perfect
\nshape<\/span>.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-450<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nefficient government and administration that are now
\ngrowing in force and necessity and it might be fatal to efficiency in anything
\nso complicated as the management of the affairs of the world. Parliamentarism
\nmeans too, in practice, the rule and often the tyranny of a majority, even of a
\nvery small majority, and the modern mind attaches increasing importance to the
\nrights of minorities. And these rights would be still more important in a
\nWorld-State where any attempt to override them might easily mean serious
\ndiscontents and disorders or even convulsions fatal to the whole fabric. Above
\nall, a Parliament of the nations must necessarily be a united parliament of
\nfree nations and could not well come into successful being in the present
\nanomalous and chaotic distribution of power in the world. The Asiatic problem
\nalone, if still left unsolved, would be a fatal obstacle and it is not alone;
\nthe inequalities and anomalies are all-pervasive and without number.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>
\nA more feasible form would be a
\nsupreme council of the free and imperial nations of the existing world-system,
\nbut this also has its difficulties. It could only be workable at first if it
\namount- ed in fact to an oligarchy of a few strong imperial nations whose voice
\nand volume would prevail at every point over that of the more<\/span> numerous but smaller
\nnon-imperialistic commonwealths and it could only endure by a progressive and,
\nif possible, a peaceful evolution from this sort of oligarchy of actual power
\nto a more just and ideal system in which the imperialistic idea would dissolve
\nand the great empires merge their separate existence into that of a unified
\nmankind. How far national egoism would allow that evolution to take place
\nwithout vehement struggles and dangerous convulsions, is, in spite of the
\nsuperficial liberal- ism now widely professed, a question still fraught with
\ngrave and ominous doubts.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n


\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>On the whole,
\nthen, whichever way we turn, this question of the form of a World-State is
\nbeset with doubts and difficulties that are for the moment insoluble. Some
\narise from the surviving sentiments and interests of the past; some menace from
\nthe rapidly developing revolutionary forces of the future. It does not follow
\nthat they can never or will- never be solved, but the way and the line any such
\nsolution would take are beyond calcu-<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\nPage-451<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n

<\/span><\/div>\n

\nlation and can really be determined only by practical
\nexperience and experiment under the pressure of the forces and necessities of
\nthe modern world. For the rest, the fom of government is not of supreme
\nimportance. The real problem is that of the unification of powers and the
\nuniformity which any manageable system of a World-State would render
\ninevitable.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-452<\/font><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CHAPTER XXIII Forms of Government   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0             THE idea of a world-union of free nations and empires, loose at first, but growing closer-knit with…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1178","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","wpcat-25-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1178","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1178"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1178\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1178"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1178"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1178"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}