{"id":1182,"date":"2013-07-13T01:33:07","date_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:33:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/?p=1182"},"modified":"2013-07-13T01:33:07","modified_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:33:07","slug":"41-some-lines-of-fulfilment-vol-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/01-works-of-sri-aurobindo\/01-sabcl\/15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15\/41-some-lines-of-fulfilment-vol-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","title":{"rendered":"-41_Some Lines of Fulfilment.htm"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n
\n
\n

\n
\nCHAPTER
\nXV<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nSome Lines of Fulfilment<\/span><\/font><\/b><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0                
\nW<\/font><\/span>HAT<\/font>
\nfavoured form, force, system <\/font> <\/span>
\namong <\/font> <\/span>
\nthe many
\nthat are possible now or likely to emerge hereafter will<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>be entrusted by the secret Will in things with the
\nexternal unification of mankind, is an interesting and to those who can look
\nbeyond the narrow horizon of passing events, a fascinating subject of speculation;
\nbut unfortunately it can at present be no- thing more. The very multitude of
\nthe possibilities in a period of humanity so rife with the most varied and
\npotent forces, so fruitful of new subjective developments and objective
\nmutations creates an impenetrable mist in which only vague forms of giants can
\nbe half glimpsed. Certain ideas suggested by the present status of forces and
\nby past experience are all that we can permit ourselves in so hazardous a
\nfield.
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>We have ruled out of consideration
\nas a practical impossibility in the present international conditions and the
\npresent state of international mentality and morality the idea of an immediate
\nsettlement on the basis of an association of free nationalities, although this
\nwould be obviously the ideal basis. For it would take as its founding motive
\npower a harmony of the two great principles actually in presence, nationalism
\nand internationalism. Its adoption would mean that the problem of human unity
\nwould be approached at once on a rational and a sound moral basis, a
\nrecognition, on one side, of the right of all large natural groupings of men to
\nlive and to be themselves and the enthronement of respect for national liberty
\nas an established principle of human con- duct, on the other, an adequate sense
\nof the need for order, help, a mutual, a common participation, a common life
\nand interests in the unified and associated human race. The ideal society or
\nState is that in which respect for individual liberty and free growth of the
\npersonal being to his perfec60n is harmonised with respect for the needs,
\nefficiency, solidarity, natural growth and<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-372<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\norganic<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>perfection of the corporate being, the society or
\nnation. In an ideal aggregate of all humanity, in the international society or
\nState, national liberty and free national growth and self- realisation ought in
\nthe same way to be progressively harmonised with the solidarity and unified
\ngrowth and perfection of <\/font>the human race.<\/font><\/span> <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0
\n<\/font>
\n<\/span>Therefore, if this basic principle were admitted, there might indeed be
\nfluctuations due to the difficulty of a perfect working combination, as in the
\ngrowth of the national aggregate there has been sometimes a stress on liberty
\nand at others a stress on efficiency and order; but since the right conditions
\nof the problem would have been recognised from the beginning and not left to be
\nworked out in a blind tug-of-war, there would be some chance of an earlier
\nreasonable solution with much less friction and violence in the process.<\/font> <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>But
\nthere is little chance of such an unprecedented good fortune for mankind. Ideal
\nconditions cannot be expected, for they demand a psychological clarity, a
\ndiffused reasonableness and scientific intelligence and, above all, a moral
\nelevation and rectitude to which neither the mass of mankind nor its leaders
\nand rulers have yet made any approach. In their absence, not reason and justice
\nand mutual kindliness, but the trend of forces and their practical and legal
\nadjustment must determine the working out of this as of other problems. And just
\nas the problem of the State and the individual has been troubled and obscured
\nnot only by the conflict between individual egoism and the corporate egoism of
\nthe society, but by the continual clash between intermediate powers, class
\nstrife, quarrels of Church and State, king and nobles, king and commons,
\naristocracy and demos, capitalist bourgeoisie and labour proletariate, this
\nproblem too of nation and international humanity is certain to be troubled by
\nthe claims of just such intermediate powers. To say nothing of commercial
\ninterests and combinations, cultural or racial sympathies, movements of
\nPan-Islamism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan- Anglo-Saxonism, with a possible
\nPan-Americanism and Pan- Mongolianism looming up in the future, to say nothing of
\nyet other unborn monsters, there will always be the great intermediate factor
\nof Imperialism, that huge armed and dominant<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nPage-373<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\nTitan, that must by its very nature demand its own<\/font><\/span> satisfaction, <\/font> <\/span>
\nat the cost of every suppressed or inconvenient
\nnational unit and assert its own needs as prior to the need~ of the new-born
\ninter. national comity. That satisfaction, presumably, it must have for a time,
\nthat demand it will be for long impossible to resist. At any rate, to ignore
\nits claims or to imagine that they can be put aside with a spurt of the
\nwriter’s pen, is to build symmetrical castles on the golden sands of an
\nimpracticable idealism.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>Forces take the first place in actual
\neffectuation; moral principles, reason, justice only so far as forces can be
\ncompelled or persuaded to admit them or, as more often happens, use them as
\nsubservient aids or inspiring battle cries, a camouflage for their own
\ninterests. Ideas sometimes leap out as armed forces and break their way through
\nthe hedge of unideal powers; sometimes they reverse the position and make
\ninterests their subordinate helpers, a fuel for their own blaze; sometimes they
\nconquer by martyrdom: but ordinarily they have to work not only by a half.
\ncovert pressure but by accommodation to powerful forces or must even bribe and
\ncajole them or work through and behind them. It cannot be otherwise until the
\naverage and the aggregate man become more of an intellectual, moral and
\nspiritual being and less predominantly the vital and emotional half-reasoning human
\nanimal. The unrealised international idea will have for some time at least to
\nwork by this secondary method and through such accommodations with the realised
\nforces of nationalism and imperialism.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>It may be questioned whether by the time
\nthat things are ready for the elaboration of a firm and settled system, the
\nidea of a just internationalism based on respect for the principle of free
\nnationalities may not by the efforts of the world’s thinkers and intellectuals
\nhave made so much progress as to exercise an irresistible pressure on States
\nand Governments and bring about its own acceptation in large part, if not in
\nthe entirety of its claims. The answer is that States and Governments yield
\nusually to a moral pressure only so far as it does not compel them to sacrifice
\ntheir vital interests. No established empire will easily liberate its dependent
\nparts or allow, unless compelled, a nation now subject to it to sit at the
\nboard of an international council as its free <\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-374<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\nequal.
\nThe old enthusiasm for liberty is an ideal which made <\/font>
\nFrance<\/font><\/span> intervene to aid the
\nevolution of a free Italy or France and <\/font> <\/span>England
\nto create a new Greek nation. The national liberties for which respect was
\ndemanded during the war even at the point of the sword<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>
\n– or, we should say now,
\neven with the voice <\/font> <\/span>of the cannon shell –
\nwere those already established and considered therefore to have the right still
\nto exist. All that was pro- posed beyond that limit was the restoration to
\nalready existing <\/font>free<\/font><\/span> States of men of their own
\nnationality still under’ a foreign <\/font> <\/span>yoke.
\nIt was proposed to realise a greater Serbia, a greater Rumania, the restoration
\nof "unredeemed" Italy, and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France.
\nAutonomy under Russian sovereignty was all that was promised to Poland till the
\nGerman victory over Russia altered the interest and with it the idealism of the
\nAllies. Autonomy of a kind under an imperial sovereignty or where that does not
\nyet exist, under imperial "protection" or "influence" are by
\nmany considered as more practical ideas now than the restoration of national
\nfreedom. That is a sign perhaps of the obscure growth of the idea of federated
\nempires which we have discussed as one of the possibilities of the future.
\nNational liberty as an absolute ideal has no longer the old general acceptation
\nand creative force. Nations struggling for liberty have to depend on their own
\nstrength and enthusiasm; they can expect only a tepid or uncertain support
\nexcept from enthusiastic individuals or small groups whose aid is purely vocal
\nand ineffective. Many even of the most advanced intellectuals warmly approve of
\nthe idea of subordinate autonomy for nations now subject, but seem to look with
\nimpatience on their velleities of complete independence. Even so far has
\nimperialism travelled on its prosperous road and the imperial aggregate
\nimpressed its figure on the freest imaginations as an accomplished power in
\nhuman progress.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>How much further may not this sentiment
\ntravel under the new impulse of humanity to organise its international
\nexistence on larger and more convenient lines! It is even possible that the
\nimpatience openly expressed by the German in his imperial days against the
\ncontinued existence of small nationalities opposing their settled barrier of
\nprescribed rights to large political and<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\nPage-375<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\ncommercial
\ncombinations may, while softening its rigour, yet justify its claim in the
\nfuture, may be accepted by the general sense of humanity though in a less
\nbrutal, a less arrogant and aggressively egoistic form. That is to say, there
\nmay grow up a stronger tendency in the political reason of mankind to desire,
\nperhaps eventually to insist on the rearrangement of States in a system of
\nlarge imperial combines and not on the basis of a status quo <\/i>of mixed empires
\nand free nationalities.1<\/sup> <\/font>
\n <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>But even if this development does not
\ntake place or does not effect itself in time, the actually existing free and
\nnon-imperial States will find themselves included indeed in whatever
\ninternational council or other system may be established, but this inclusion is
\nlikely to be very much like the position of the small , nobles in mediaeval
\ntimes in relation to the great feudal princes,\u00a0
\n<\/span>a position rather of vassals than of equals. The war brought into relief
\nthe fact that it is only the great Powers that really count in the
\ninternational scale; all others merely exist by sufferance or by protection or
\nby alliance. So long as the world was arranged on the principle of separate
\nnationalities, this might have been only a latent reality without actually
\nimportant effects on the life of the smaller nations, but this immunity might
\ncease when the necessity of combined action or a continual active interaction
\nbecame a recognised part or the foundation of the world-system. The position of
\na minor State standing out against the will of large Powers or a party of
\nPowers would be worse even than that of small neutrals in the present war or of
\na private company surrounded by great Trusts. It would be compelled to accept
\nthe lead of one group or another of the leviathans around it and its
\nindependent weight or action in the council of nations would be nil.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>Undoubtedly, the right of small nations
\nto exist and assert their interests against imperialistic aggression is still a
\nforce; it was one at least of the issues in the international collision. But
\nthe assertion of this right against the aggression of a single ambitious Power
\nis one thing; its assertion as against any arrangement for the common interest
\nof the nations decided upon by a<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n1  <\/font><\/sup>If the ambitions of Italy, Germany and Japan and the Fascist idea
\ngenerally had triumphed, such an order of things might have eventuated<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-376<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\n\u00a0<\/font><\/span>majority of the great Powers would very likely in the near
\nfuture be regarded in quite another light. The inconvenience of a number of
\nsmall neutrals claiming to stand out and be as little affected<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>
\nas possible by an immense
\ninternational conflict was <\/font> <\/span>acutely felt
\nnot only by the actual combatants who were obliged to use sometimes an
\nindirect, sometimes a direct pressure to minimise the inconveniences, but by
\nthe smaller neutrals themselves to whom their neutrality was preferable only as
\na lesser evil than the burden and disaster of active participation in the struggle.
\nIn any international system, the self-assertion of these smaller liberties
\nwould probably be viewed as a petty egoism and ‘ff intolerable obstacle to
\ngreat common interests, or, it may be, to the decision of conflicts between
\ngreat world-wide interests. It is probable indeed that in any constitution of
\ninternational unity the great Powers would see to it that their voice was equal
\n<\/font>
\n\u00a0<\/font><\/span>to their force and influence; but even if the
\nconstitution were <\/font> <\/span>outwardly democratic,
\nyet, in effect, it would become an oligarchy of the great Powers. Constitutions
\ncan only disguise facts, they cannot abrogate them: for whatever ideas the form
\nof the constitution may embody, its working is always that of the actually
\nrealised forces which can use it with effect. Most governments either have now
\nor have passed through a democratic form, but nowhere yet has there been a real
\ndemocracy; it has been everywhere the propertied and professional classes and
\nthe bourgeoisie who governed in the name of the people. So too in any international
\nCouncilor control it would be a few great empires that would govern in the name
\nof humanity.
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>At the most, if it were otherwise,
\nit could be only for a short time, unless some new forces came into their own
\nwhich would arrest or dissolve the tendency now dominant in the world towards
\nlarge imperial aggregations. The position would then be for a time very much
\nlike that of feudal Europe while it was in abortive travail of a united
\nChristendom, – a great criss-cross of heterogeneous, complicated, overlapping
\nand mutually interpenetrating interests, a number of small Powers counting for
\nsomething, but overshadowed and partly coerced by a few great Powers, the great
\nPowers working out the inevitable complication of their allied, divided and contrary
\ninterests by whatever<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-377<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\nmeans
\nthe new world-system provided and using for that purpose whatever support of
\nclasses, ideas, tendencies, institutions they could find. There would be
\nquestions of Asiatic, African, American fiefs and markets, struggles or <\/i>classes
\nstarting as national questions becoming international; Socialism, Anarchism and
\nthe remainder of the competitive age of humanity struggling together for
\npredominance; clashes of Europeanism, Asiaticism, Americanism. And from this
\ngreat tangle some result would have to be worked out. It might well be by
\nmethods very different from those with which history has made us so familiar;
\nwar might be eliminated or reduced to. a rare phenomenon of civil war in the
\ninternational commonwealth or confederacy; new forms of coercion, such as the
\ncommercial which we now see to be growing in frequency, might ordinarily take
\nits place; other devices might be brought into being of which we have at
\npresent no conception. But the situation would be essentially the same for
\nhumanity in general as has confronted lesser unformed aggregates in the past
\nand would have to progress to similar issues of success, modified realisation
\nor failure.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>The most natural simplification of the
\nproblem, though not one that looks now possible, would be the division of the
\nworld into a few imperial aggregates consisting partly of federal, partly of
\nconfederate commonwealths or empires. Although unrealisable with the present
\nstrength of national egoisms, the growth of ideas and the force of changing
\ncircumstances might some day bring about such a creation and this might lead to
\na closer confederacy. America seems to be turning dimly towards a better
\nunderstanding between the increasingly cosmopolitan United States and the Latin
\nRepublics of Central and South America which may in certain contingencies
\nmaterialise itself into a confederate inter-American State. The idea of a
\nconfederate Teutonic empire, if Germany and Austria had not been entirely
\nbroken by the result of the war, might well have realised itself in the near
\nfuture; and even though they are now broken it might still realise itself in a
\nmore distant future1<\/sup> () Similar aggregates may emerge
\nin the Asiatic world. Such a distribution of<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n1  <\/sup>Unfortunately this result seems destined to disappear by the formidable
\nsurvival of a military Germany under the Fuhrer<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-378<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\nmankind<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>
\nin large natural aggregates
\nwould have the advantage <\/font> <\/span>of simplifying a
\nnumber of difficult world-problems and with the growth of peace, mutual
\nunderstanding and larger ideas might lead to a comparatively painless final
\naggregation in a <\/font>World-State.<\/font> <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>Another possible solution is suggested by
\nthe precedent of the evolution of the nation-type out of its first loose feudal
\nform. As there the continual clash of various forces and equipollent powers
\nnecessitated the emergence of one of them, at first only prominent among his
\nequals, the feudal king, into the type of a centralised monarchy, so
\nconceivably, if the empires and nations of the world failed to arrive at a
\npeaceful solution among them- selves, if the class troubles, the
\ninter-commercial troubles, the conflict of various new ideas and tendencies
\nresulted in a long confusion and turmoil and constant changing, there might
\nemerge a king-nation with the mission of evolving a real and settled out of a
\nsemi-chaotic or half order. We have concluded that the military conquest of the
\nworld by a single nation is not possible except under conditions which do not
\nnow exist and of which there is as yet no visible prospect.<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>
\n.<\/font><\/span> <\/font> <\/span>But an imperial nation,
\n<\/font>such as England for example, spread over all
\nthe world, possessing the empire of the seas, knowing how to federate
\nsuccessfully its constituent parts and organise their entire potential
\nstrength, having the skill to make itself the representative and protector of
\nthe most progressive and liberal tendencies of the new times, allying itself
\nwith other forces and nations interested in their triumph and showing that it
\nhad the secret of a just and effective international organisation, might
\nconceivably become the arbiter of the nations and the effective centre of an
\ninternational government. Such a possibility in any form is as yet entirely
\nremote, but it could become under new circumstances a realisable possibility of
\nthe future.<\/font> <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0
\n<\/font>
\n<\/span>Conceivably, if the task of organising the world proved too difficult,
\nif no lasting agreement could be arrived at or no firmly constituted legal
\nauthority erected, the task might be undertaken not by a single predominant
\nempire, but by two or three great imperial Powers sufficiently near in interest
\nand united in idea to sink possible differences and jealousies and strong
\nenough to<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-379<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\ndominate or crush all resistance and enforce some
\nsort of<\/font><\/span>
\n<\/font> <\/span>effective international law and government1<\/sup> The process
\nwould then be a sufficiently painful one and might involve much brutality of
\nmoral and economic coercion, but if it commanded the prestige of success and
\nevolved some tolerable form of legality and justice or even only of prosperous
\norder, it might in the end conciliate a general moral support and prove. a
\nstarting-point for freer and better forms.<\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/font> <\/span>Yet another possibility that cannot be
\nignored is that the merely inter-governmental and political evolution which
\nalone we have considered, may be broken in upon by the long-threatened war of
\nclasses. Labour internationalism broke down, like every other form of
\ninternationalism – scientific, cultural, pacific, religious<\/font> <\/font> <\/span>
\n–<\/font><\/span> <\/font> <\/span>
\nunder the fierce test of war
\nand during the great <\/font> <\/span>crisis the struggle
\nbetween Labour and Capital was suspended. It was then hoped that after the war
\nthe spirit of unity, conciliation and compromise would continue to reign and
\nthe threatened conflict would be averted. Nothing in human nature or in history
\nwarranted any such confident trust in the hopes of the moment. The interclass
\nconflict has long been threatening like the European collision. The advent of
\nthe latter was preceded by large hopes of world-peace and attempts at a
\nEuropean concert and treaties of arbitration which would render war finally
\nimpossible. The hope of a concert between Labour and Capital idyllically
\nsettling all their acute causes of conflict in amoebaean stanzas of melodious
\ncompromise for the sake of the higher national interests is likely to be as
\ntreacherous and delusive. Even the socialisation of governments and the
\nincreasing nationalisation of industry will not remove the root cause of
\nconflict. For there will still remain the crucial question of the form and
\nconditions of the new State socialism, whether it shall be regulated in the
\ninterests of Labour or of the capitalistic State and whether its direction
\nshall be democratic by the workers them- selves or oligarchic or bureaucratic
\nby the present directing classes. This question may well lead to struggles which
\nmay easily<\/font><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n1 <\/sup>If, for instance, a struggle
\ncame to a head between the democratic and the totalitarian Powers, the combined force of
\na victorious Britain, France and America or in the contrary event, of the
\nFascist Powers, might impose an initial order in the world<\/font><\/span>.<\/font><\/p>\n

\nPage-380<\/font><\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n\u00a0<\/font><\/span>grow<\/font><\/span> into an international or at
\nleast an inter-European conflict; it might even rend each nation in two instead
\nof uniting it as in the war crisis. And the results of such a struggle may have
\nan incalculable effect, either in changing the ideas and life of men <\/font> <\/span>
\ndynamically in new directions or in breaking down the
\nbarriers of existing nations and empires.1<\/sup> <\/font><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n1 <\/sup>This hypothetic forecast was fully justified – and
\ntended to become more and more so – by the post-war development of national and
\ninternational life. The inhuman butchery in Spain, the development of two
\nopposite types of Socialism in Russia, Italy and Germany, the uneasy political
\nsituation in France were examples of the fulfilment of these tendencies. But
\nthis tendency has reached its acme in the emergence of Communism and it now
\nseems probable that the future will belong to a struggle between Communism and a
\nsurviving capitalistic Industrialism in the New World or even between Communism
\nand a more moderate system of social democracy in the two continents of the Old
\nWorld. But generally speaking, speculations noted down in this chapter at a time
\nwhen the possibilities of the future were very different from what they are now
\nand all was in a flux and welter of dubious confusion, are out of date since an
\neven more stupendous conflict has intervened and swept the previous existing
\nconditions out of existence. Nevertheless, some of them still survive and
\nthreaten the safe evolution of the new tentative world-order or, indeed, any
\nfuture world-order.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-381<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CHAPTER XV Some Lines of Fulfilment   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0                 WHAT favoured form, force, system among the many that are possible now or likely to emerge hereafter…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1182","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-15-social-and-political-thought-volume-15","wpcat-25-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1182","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1182"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1182\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1182"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1182"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1182"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}