{"id":1964,"date":"2013-07-13T01:38:34","date_gmt":"2013-07-13T08:38:34","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/?p=1964"},"modified":"2013-11-30T00:51:18","modified_gmt":"2013-11-30T08:51:18","slug":"35-private-letters-to-public-figures-1948-1950-vol-36-autobiographical-notes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/01-works-of-sri-aurobindo\/03-cwsa\/36-autobiographical-notes\/35-private-letters-to-public-figures-1948-1950-vol-36-autobiographical-notes","title":{"rendered":"-35_Private Letters to Public Figures 1948 – 1950.htm"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\n\n
<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tNotes and Letters <\/p>\n

to the Editor of Mother India<\/i> <\/p>\n

on Indian and World Events <\/p>\n

1949 \u00ad 1950<\/font><\/b> <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t<\/p>\n

On Pakistan
\n\t\t\t<\/b><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

I don’t want Pakistan to endure, made perfectly clear. Division
\nmust go \u2014 does not mean that division must be allowed to last in some form or other. Continued partition of India into two
\nFederations one Hindu and one Muslim even if somehow connected together is no part of my idea of the Union of India. <\/p>\n

March 1949 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n


\n\t\t\tOn the Commonwealth and Secularism
\n\t\t\t<\/a> <\/b><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\tIndia can’t remain in Dominion. It had decided to be a free republic and that can’t be changed. On that basis it can have
\nrelations with Commonwealth if it wants.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tSpirituality cannot be affirmed in a political constitution.
\nYou can add spirituality in a matter of the Spirit and not of constitutional politics. <\/p>\n

April 1949<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n


\n\t\t\tOn the Unity Party <\/a> <\/b><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t<\/p>\n

Amal<\/b><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\tThe Unity Party, Sri Aurobindo says, cannot be said to
\nrepresent Sri Aurobindo’s views [nor can it be said]1<\/font><\/sup> that<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t its political programme is backed up by him. But perhaps without
\ncommitting yourself you can say there is a Party, especially in Bengal, which is working for Indian Unity
\n\u2014 apart from the <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t1 MS (dictated) <\/i>or  
\n<\/font><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>514<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\n

\nwell-known Forward Block which has the same end in view though working on a different line. <\/p>\n

\n25.4.1949 <\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nOn French India and on Pakistan
\n<\/a>
\n<\/b><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n

June 27 1949 <\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nAmal, <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tI sent you a telegram asking you to withhold the spokesman’s statement.2<\/font><\/sup> It was not to be republished. The statement
\ndoes not adequately represent Sri Aurobindo’s views. It overstresses one point and leaves out others which are as important,
\nbut I see that you have already featured it in Mother India. Anyway Sri Aurobindo doesn’t want anything further to be
\nwritten about his view on the French India question; what is done is done but in future he wishes to remain silent unless an
\nimperative need arises for a statement. Just now Sri Aurobindo does not want strong attacks to be made on the policy of the
\nCongress Government as by their action they have removed many of the difficulties of the Asram and all that it needs for
\nits institutions are coming in freely as a result of special orders given by the Madras Government so he does not want
\nto figure as their enemy or opponent. Certain things in their attitude may seem doubtful but he does not want them too
\nmuch stressed at present unless it becomes very necessary to do so. <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tAbout your Franco-India article, the main objection is that Mother does not want herself to be represented in that way
\n(or in any way) and she objects to figuring in any special way as a representative of France or French culture. The article is
\ninopportune at this moment. It contains many statements that would have to be modified or not put forward at all. <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tAs for the contravention article Sri Aurobindo thought that<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t2 This letter, dictated by Sri Aurobindo, was sent over the signature of Nolini Kanta<\/i>
\nGupta. The “spokesman’s statement” was an interview that Nolini gave to a press<\/i>
\nagency on 14 June that was published in <\/i>Mother India on 25 June. See Note on the<\/i>
\nTexts, pages 604 \u00ad 5, for details. \u2014 Ed.<\/i>  
\n<\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>515<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\n

one could wait to see what was the further action or attitude or inaction of the Government and whether what was meant
\nwas a complete prohibition of any dealing with the Pakistan issue before you determined the paper’s own attitude towards
\nall that and any extreme action. That does not mean that you will have to postpone indefinitely any necessary decision. If you
\nthink it necessary to take advantage of Nehru’s speech that can be done while avoiding committing ourselves to any conflict for
\nthe moment. <\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

On Cardinal Wyszynski, Catholicism and Communism
\n<\/a>
\n<\/b><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

As to your proposed article on [Wyszynski]3<\/font><\/sup>, it seems to me that it is better to drop the subject. It had and has no value except
\nas a stick with which to beat the Soviets and their allies. The sole question is in that case whether the man was justified in his
\nstand for liberty even in that restricted area of religious freedom and the freedom especially of the Catholic religion to be itself,
\nas every religion has a right to be in all civilised countries and whether it was worth while fighting out that question when the
\nreal question is how to get rid, if now it is at all possible, of the Bolshevik monstrosity and the tyranny with which it threatens
\nthe world. That can’t be done by subtly philosophical and even metaphysical articles balancing the rights and wrongs on each
\nside and the relative wickedness of the Soviets and the Western nations. Many readers might even take it as a justification or at
\nleast a partial condemnation of the prosecuting Government and the martyrdom it has chosen to inflict on the rebellious Cardinal.
\nAnd what is the pertinence of the past history of the Roman Catholic Church, especially at a time when we have one of the
\nmost liberal minded Popes or even the most liberal minded Pope in Roman Catholic history? Even if it is only a fight between the
\nHoly See of Rome and the unholy See of the Kremlin the fight is between one centre of religious intolerance and another centre
\nof a still more damnable and intolerant religion, \u2014 for that is<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t3 MS (dictated)
\n<\/i>Midsentzy
\n   <\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>516<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\nwhat Bolshevism is, \u2014 still why give any latitude to what is by far the worse of the two? <\/p>\n

\n3 August 1949 <\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nOn the Kashmir Problem
\n<\/a>
\n<\/b><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nNow let us come to your article. All you have written up to the X mark against the beginning of a para is very good and needed
\nto be said; but after that there are certain things to which I have to take objection. For instance, why suggest a slur on the whole
\nMohammedan population of Kashmir by speaking of “fanatic spell of the name of Allah”? This cannot apply to the Kashmiris
\nwho follow Abdullah and who are in a large majority, they are for his idea of a secular state. The others in Gilgit and elsewhere
\nare not actuated by religious fanaticism but by political motives. The rest of the sentence should be modified accordingly; the people in the districts who have been rescued from the grip of the rebels have shown strong gratitude for their release and it would
\nbe quite impolitic to ignore by such doubts the sincerity of this gratitude. I am not enamoured of your idea of an understanding
\nbetween Pakistan and India, it is not likely that the Pakistan Government will consent to any understanding except one which
\nwill help to perpetuate the partition and be to their advantage. It would be most dangerous to forget Jinnah’s motive and policy
\nin establishing Pakistan which is still the motive and policy of the Pakistan leaders,
\n\u2014 although it would not be politic to say
\nanything about it just now. If you keep what you have written it should be with the proviso, if there is a change of heart and
\nif Pakistan becomes willing to effect some kind of junction with India or some overtopping Council of cooperation between the
\ntwo federations. But the most amazing thing is your disastrous suggestion of a coalition Government between the loyalists and
\nthe rebels in Kashmir. That would give a position and influence and control over all the affairs of the State to the supporters of
\nPakistan which they can never hope to have under the present circumstances. They would be able to appoint their own men
\nin the administration, use intimidation and trickery in order to press people to vote against their will and generally falsify
\n   <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>517<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\n

the plebiscite, and they certainly would not hesitate to do all that they could for that end. It might very well knock all the
\ngood cards out of Abdullah’s hands and smash up his present predominant chances of a favourable issue of the plebiscite. <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tThere is a passage in your article containing a trenchant suggestion which has puzzled me. You seem to say that India
\nhas been beaten on the military ground in Kashmir and there is no hope of her keeping it or clearing out the invaders; her last
\nchance is the plebiscite and that is the reason why she is insisting on the plebiscite. Is that at all true? It would mean that Indian
\nmilitary strength is unable to cope with that of Pakistan and then, if she cannot cope with it in Kashmir in spite of her initial
\nadvantage, can she do it anywhere? If she gives up Kashmir because of her military weakness that encourages Pakistan to
\ncarry through Jinnah’s plan with regard to the establishment of Muslim rule in Northern India and they will try it out. I don’t
\nthink this is really the case. It was for political motives, I take it, and not from a consciousness of military weakness that India did
\nnot push her initial advantage, and she insisted on the plebiscite, not because it was her last or only chance but because it gave
\nher the best chance. In a plebiscite on the single and straight issue of joining either Pakistan or India she was and is quite
\nconfident of an overwhelming majority in her favour. Moreover, she does not cling to the plebiscite from motives of ideological
\npurity and will even refuse it if it is to be held on any conditions other than those she has herself clearly and insistently laid down.
\nShe is quite prepared to withdraw the case from the cognizance of the U.N.O and retain Kashmir by her own means and even,
\nif necessary, by fight to the finish, if that is unavoidable. That Patel has made quite clear and uncompromisingly positive and
\nNehru has not been less positive. Both of them are determined to resist to the bitter end any attempt to force a solution which
\nis not consistent with the democratic will of the Kashmir people and their right of self-determination of their own destiny. At the
\nsame time they are trying to avoid a clash if it is at all possible.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tOne thing which both Abdullah and the India Government
\nwant to avoid and have decided to resist by all possible means   <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>518<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\nis a partition of Kashmir, especially with Gilgit and Northern Kashmir going to Pakistan. This is the greatest danger but the
\ndetails and the reasons for the possibility of its materialising, though they are plain enough, have to be kept confidential or, at
\nany rate, not to be discussed in public. But if you take account of it, it will be easier to understand the situation and the whole
\npolicy of the India Government. That at least is the stand taken by them and the spirit of the terms they have laid down for the
\nconditions of the plebiscite. These conditions have been just at this moment published in the newspapers and the whole course
\nof negotiations with the U.N.O. Kashmir Commission has been laid bare in a public statement. Practically, the Commission
\nrepresentative has conceded on its part almost all the essential demands and conditions laid down by Nehru. All, however,
\nremains fluid until and unless the Security Council acquiesces in the arrangements proposed by their own Commission or else
\ntake a different decision and until the plebiscite Administrator is appointed and makes the final arrangements. What will finally
\ntranspire from all this lies as the Greeks used to say on the knees \u00af<\/i>
\nof the Gods, theon en gounasi keitai<\/i>. It lies also with the reactions of the Pakistan leaders which are more easily calculable,
\nbut may not show themselves until a possibly much later date.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tIn any case, it seems to me that our only course is to support
\nthe India Government in the stand they are taking in regard to Kashmir and the terms and conditions they have made, so long
\nas they do not weaken and deviate from their position. Nothing should be said which would discourage the public mind or call
\naway the support which the Government needs in maintaining the right course. What I have written on Kashmir is only my
\npersonal view at present based on the information I have and must be kept quite private. But it may perhaps be of some help to
\nyou in determining what you may say or not say about Kashmir.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tSince the above was written there has appeared Pakistan’s interpretation of the Commission’s arrangement for the plebiscite. It looks as if Lozano had made his statements
\nas smooth as possible to either party so that they got very different impressions of what was meant to be done. However
\n   <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>519<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\n

there is only one important point and that is about the Azad armies. If these are allowed to remain in arms in the places they
\nnow occupy the plebiscite will become a farce. But the India authorities seem to have received a definite promise from Lozano
\nthat it will be otherwise. We shall have to wait and see what will be the definite arrangements and how the Commission will
\nget out of this imbroglio. But Pakistan in this matter is showing a mentality that makes one wonder whether it is worth while
\nyour suggesting the possibility of an amicable rapprochement between the two parts of partitioned India such as you have
\ngone out of your way to elaborate in your article. <\/p>\n

\n

c. September 1949 <\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

On “New Year Thoughts” <\/a> <\/b><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Some of the statements in your article4<\/font><\/sup> do not seem to me quite
\nconvincing, as for instance, the suggestion that one cannot be highly ethical or exaltedly ethical without being religious or
\nhighly religious or even a mystic without knowing it. The article is tremendously manysided and some readers might find it difficult to fit all the sides together; but I put this remark forward as an observation and not as an objection. Manysidedness is a
\nmerit and cannot be regarded as objectionable. Finally I want my “face” in the last sentence to be left out of the picture. I feel its
\nappearance as an unexpected intrusion there; it had better retire into privacy. As for Nehru, I suppose the fling at him cannot be
\nregarded as offensive, but I would rather like it, for reasons of my own, if there came upon you a temporary amnesia about his
\nexistence. <\/p>\n

\n

1 January 1950 <\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Rishis as Leaders <\/a> <\/b><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The article can go as the editorial as you propose and the other
\narrangements are all right. But I must insist that the last words<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t4 “New Year Thoughts on Pacifism”, by K. D. Sethna. This article was published in<\/i>
\nMother India on 7 January 1951. The printed version incorporated changes suggested<\/i>
\nby Sri Aurobindo in this letter. \u2014 Ed.<\/i>
\n<\/font><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/span><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>520<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n“till we put ourselves in the care of some Rishis among leaders”
\nshall go out. I do not know of course who may be acclaimed as the Rishi in question,
\n\u2014 the only one with a recognised claim to
\nthe title is not likely to be called from Tiruvannamalai to Delhi and would certainly refuse his consent to the transfer. But it is
\nevident that the eyes of your readers will turn at once towards Pondicherry and consider that it is a claim for my appointment
\neither to the place filled so worthily by C. R. or the kindred place admirably occupied by Nehru. I am a candidate for neither office
\nand any suggestion of my promotion to these high offices should be left to other announcers and the last place in which it should
\noccur is Mother India. So out with the “Rishi”. You may say if you like “till the eyes of India’s leaders see more clearly and we
\ncan take our place at your side” or any other equally innocent phrase. <\/p>\n

\nJanuary 1950 <\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nOn Military Action
\n<\/a>
\n<\/b><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nAmal,<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tSri Aurobindo’s information is that the India Government
\ncannot be justly taxed with unwillingness to take even the strongest action demanded by the situation. But there are difficulties in the way hinging on the [attitude]5<\/font><\/sup> of the U.N.O. and the possibility of taking action which could from the military
\npoint of view disable a successful prosecution of the necessary action involved in the step we want them to take. Certain means
\nare necessary for military success and we can have them only from America. So it is better not to write in haste or to get the
\nfacts of the situation and base what you write upon that. This does not mean that the action has not to be taken but that it
\ncannot be lightly done; if by a little delay and some secrecy and caution the difficulty can be overcome or avoided, that may be
\nnecessary however unpalatable. <\/p>\n

\n

6.3.50 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t5 MS (dictated) <\/i>altitude  
\n<\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>521<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\n

The Nehru-Liaquat Pact and After
\n<\/a> <\/b><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Amal <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tI am writing to explain the indications I had given of my view that a change has taken place in the situation owing to
\nthe Nehru-Liaquat Pact making the position I took in the letter to Dilip6<\/font><\/sup> no longer quite valid and necessitating a halt for a
\nreconsideration and decision of policy. I gather from what you have written that you are rather surprised by my view of things
\nand think that there is no change in the situation; you seem to regard the Pact as a futile affair not likely to succeed or to make
\nany change in the situation and foredoomed to speedy failure. I would like to know what are the grounds for this view if you
\nreally hold it. I am quite prepared to learn that the situation is quite different from what it seems to be but that must be based
\non facts and the facts published in the newspapers or claimed as true by the Congress leaders point in a different direction. There
\nseems to be something, initially at least, like a radical change in the situation and I have to face it, look at the possible and
\nprobable consequences and decide what has to be done.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tWhat was the situation when the Dilip letter was written and what is it today? At that time everything had been pushed to a point at which war still seemed inevitable. The
\ntension between Pakistan and India had grown more and more intolerable in every aspect, the massacres in East Bengal still
\nseemed to make war inevitable and the India Government had just before Nehru’s attempt to patch up a compromise made
\nready to march its army over the East Bengal borders once a few preliminaries had been arranged and war in Kashmir
\nwould have inevitably followed. America and Britain would not have been able to support Pakistan and, if our information is
\ncorrect, had already intimated their inability to prevent India Government from taking the only possible course open to it in
\nface of the massacres. In the circumstances the end of Pakistan would have been the certain consequence of war. The object we <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t6 See the letter of 4 April 1950, published on pages 506 \u00ad 7. \u2014 Ed.<\/i>  
\n\t\t\t<\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>522<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\nhad in view would have been within sight of achievement.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tNow all this is changed. After the conclusion of the Pact,
\nafter its acceptance by the Congress Party and the Assembly and its initial success of organisation and implementation, its
\nacceptance also in both Western and Eastern Pakistan, no outbreak of war can take place at least for some time to come and,
\nunless the Pact fails, it may not take place. That may mean in certain contingencies the indefinite perpetuation of the existence
\nof Pakistan and disappearance of the prospect of any unification of India. I regard the Pact as an exceedingly clever move of
\nLiaquat Ali to fish his “nation” out of the desperate situation into which it had run itself and to secure its safe survival. I will
\nnot go elaborately into the reasons for my view and I am quite prepared for events breaking out which will alter the situation
\nonce more in an opposite sense. But I had to take things as they are or seem to be, weigh everything and estimate the position and
\nmake my decisions. I will not say more in this letter, though I may have much to say hereafter: you should be able to understand
\nfrom what I have written why I have reversed my course. Our central object and the real policy of the paper stands, but what
\nsteps have to be taken or can be taken in the new circumstances can only be seen in the light of future developments. <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tMeanwhile I await your answer with regard to the question I have put you. Afterwards I shall write again especially about
\nthe stand to be taken by Mother India. <\/p>\n

\n

3.5.50 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n

\n\t\t\tOn the Communist Movement<\/b>
\n\t\t\t<\/a> <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n

September 19, 1950 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n

Naturally I am in agreement with the views expressed about Communism in the Manifesto,7<\/font><\/sup> but before associating myself
\nfully with Masani’s organisation and his movement I will have to wait and see how it develops in the field of practical politics. <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t7 “Manifesto for the Defence of Democracy and Independence in Asia”, by Swatantra<\/i>
\nParty leader Minoo Masani. \u2014 Ed.<\/i>
\n  
\n<\/font> <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>523<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

\n

For similar reasons I might expect you as editor of M.I. to wait and see and in that case it would be logical to withhold your
\nsignature while expressing your sympathy with the movement. Whatever is done must be something strong and effective, a blow
\nthat can tell; otherwise, the Communist movement has become so powerful that it can feed upon the shocks one tries to give
\nit as one can see in the tussle that is going on in the UNO. As to Desai’s objections, it seems to me that if any movement of
\nthe kind is made it would be worth while to make it as widely representative as possible and in that case the Socialists like Jai
\nPrakash who distrust and are opposed to Communism would have to be included. There is such a thing as social democracy
\nwhich need not be confused with Communism as it has its own more manageable standpoints: of course I agree with Desai as
\nregards our standing on the side of Western democracies.   <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\tPage \u2013 <\/font>524<\/font><\/p>\n

\t\t\t<\/span><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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