{"id":3137,"date":"2013-07-13T01:46:15","date_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:46:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/?p=3137"},"modified":"2013-07-13T01:46:15","modified_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:46:15","slug":"31-the-idea-of-a-league-of-nations-vol-the-ideal-of-human-unity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/01-works-of-sri-aurobindo\/02-other-editions\/the-ideal-of-human-unity\/31-the-idea-of-a-league-of-nations-vol-the-ideal-of-human-unity","title":{"rendered":"-31_The Idea of a League of Nations.htm"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\n\n
\n

\nCHAPTER XXIX <\/font>
\n<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\nTHE IDEA OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS<\/b><\/font>
\n<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n T<\/font>HE<\/font> only means that readily suggests itself by which a
\nnecessary group-freedom can be preserved and yet the unification
\nof the human race achieved, is to strive not towards a closely
\norganised world-State, but towards a free, elastic and progressive
\nworld-union. If this is to be done, we shall have to discourage
\nthe almost inevitable tendency which must lead any unification
\nby political, economic and administrative means, in a word, by
\nthe force of machinery, to follow the analogy of the evolution of
\nthe nation-State. And we shall have to encourage and revive that
\nforce of idealistic nationalism which, before the war, seemed on
\nthe point of being crushed on the one side under the weight of
\nthe increasing world-empires of England, Russia, Germany and
\nFrance, on the other by the progress of the opposite ideal of
\ninternationalism with its large and devastating contempt for the
\nnarrow ideas of country and nation and its denunciation of the
\nevils of nationalistic patriotism. But at the same time we shall
\nhave to find a cure for the as yet incurable separative sentiments
\nnatural to the very idea to which we shall have to give a renewed
\nstrength. How is all this to be done? <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nOn our side in the attempt we have the natural principle of
\ncompensating reactions. The law of action and reaction, valid
\neven in physical Science, is in human action, which must always
\ndepend largely on psychological forces, a more constant and pervading truth. That in life to every pressure of active forces there
\nis a tendency of reaction of opposite or variative forces which <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-265 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nmay not immediately operate but must eventually come into the
\nfield or which may not act with an equal and entirely compensating force, but must act with some force of compensation, may
\nbe taken as well established. It is both a philosophical necessity
\nand a constant fact of experience. For Nature works by a balancing system of the interplay of opposite forces. When she has
\ninsisted for some time on the dominant force of one tendency
\nas against all others, she seeks to correct its exaggerations by reviving, if dead, or newly awakening, if only in slumber, or bringing into the field in a new and modified form the tendency that is
\nexactly opposite. After long insistence on centralisation, she tries
\nto modify it by at least a subordinated decentralisation. After
\ninsisting on more and more uniformity, she calls again into play
\nthe spirit of multiform variation. The result need not be an
\nequipollence of the two tendencies, it may be any kind of compromise. Or, instead of a compromise it may be in act a fusion
\nand in result a new creation which shall be a compound of both
\nprinciples. We may expect her to apply the same method to the
\ntendencies of unification and group variation in dealing with
\nthe great mass unit of humanity. At present, the nation is the
\nfulcrum which the latter tendency has been using for its imperialistic workings as against the imperialistic tendency of unifying assimilation. Now the course of Nature’s working in
\nhumanity may destroy the nation-unit, as she destroyed the tribe
\nand clan, and develop a quite new principle of grouping; but
\nshe may preserve it and give it sufficient power of vitality and
\nduration to balance usefully the trend towards too heavy a force
\nof unification. It is this latter contingency that we have to consider. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nThe two forces in action before the war were imperialism\u2014or various colours, the more rigid imperialism of Germany, the
\nmore liberal imperialism of England,\u2014and nationalism. They
\nwere the two sides of one phenomenon, the aggressive or expansive and the defensive aspects of national egoism. But in
\nthe trend of imperialism this egoism had some eventual chance
\nof dissolving itself by excessive self-enlargement, as the aggressive <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-266 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\n
\ntribe disappeared, for example, the Persian tribe first into the
\nempire and then into the nationality of the Persian people, or as
\nthe city state also disappeared, first into the Roman empire and
\nthen both tribe and city state without hope of revival into the
\nnations which arose by fusion out of the irruption of the German
\ntribes into the declining Latin unity. In the same or a similar way
\naggressive national imperialism by overspreading the world might
\nend in destroying altogether the nation-unit as the city state and
\ntribe were destroyed by the aggressive expansion of a few dominant city states and tribes. The force of defensive nationalism
\nhas reacted against this tendency, and restricted it and constantly
\nthwarted its evolutionary aim. But before the war, the separative force of nationalism seemed doomed to impotence and final
\nsuppression in face of the tremendous power with which science,
\norganisation and efficiency had armed the governing States of
\nthe large imperial aggregates. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nAll the facts were pointing in one direction. Korea had disappeared into the nascent Japanese empire on the mainland of
\nAsia. Persian nationalism had succumbed and lay suppressed
\nunder a system of spheres of influence which were really a veiled
\nprotectorate,\u2014and all experience shows that the beginning of a
\nprotectorate is also the beginning of the end of the protected
\nnation; it is an euphemistic name for the first process of chewing
\nprevious to deglutition. Tibet and Siam were so weak and visibly
\ndeclining that their continued immunity could not be hoped for.
\nChina had only escaped by the jealousies of the world-Powers
\nand by its size which made it an awkward morsel to swallow, let
\nalone to digest. The partition of all Asia between four or five or
\nat the most six great empires seemed a foregone conclusion which
\nnothing but an unexampled international convulsion could prevent. The European conquest of Northern Africa had practically
\nbeen completed by the disappearance of Morocco, the confirmed
\nEnglish protectorate over Egypt and the Italian hold on Tripoli.
\nSomaliland was in a preliminary process of slow deglutition; <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nAbyssinia, saved once by Menelik but now torn by internal discord, was the object of a revived dream of Italian colonial empire<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-267 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nThe Boer republics had gone under before the advancing
\ntide of imperialistic aggression. All the rest of Africa practically
\nwas the private property of three great Powers and two small
\nones. In Europe, no doubt, there were still a few small independent nations, Balkan and Teutonic, and also two quite unimportant neutralised countries. But the Balkans were a constant
\ntheatre of uncertainty and disturbance and the rival national
\negoisms could only have ended in case of the ejection of Turkey
\nfrom Europe, either by the formation of a young, hungry and
\nambitious Slav empire under the dominance of Serbia or Bulgaria or by their disappearance into the shadow of Austria and
\nRussia. The Teutonic states were coveted by expanding Germany
\nand, had that Power been guided by the prudently daring diplomacy of a new Bismarck,\u2014a not unlikely contingency, could
\nWilliam II have gone to the grave before letting loose the hounds
\nof war,\u2014their absorption might well have been compassed. There
\nremained America where imperialism had not yet arisen, but it
\nwas already emerging in the form of Rooseveltian Republicanism
\nand the interference in Mexico, hesitating as it was, yet pointed
\nto the inevitability of a protectorate and a final absorption of
\nthe disorderly Central American republics; the union of South
\nAmerica would then have become a defensive necessity. It was
\nonly the stupendous cataclysm of the world war which interfered
\nwith the progressive march towards the division of the world
\ninto less than a dozen great empires. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nThe war revived with a startling force the idea of free nationality, throwing it up in three forms, each with a stamp of its
\nown. First, in opposition to the imperialistic ambitions of Germany in Europe, the allied nations, although empires, were
\nobliged to appeal to a qualified ideal of free nationality and pose
\nas its champions and protectors. America, more politically idealistic than Europe, entered the war with a cry for a league of frc6
\nnations. Finally, the original idealism of the Russian revolution
\ncast into this new creative chaos an entirely new element by the
\ndistinct, positive, uncompromising recognition, free from ail
\nreserves of diplomacy and self-interest, of the right of every aggregate of men naturally marked off from other aggregates to <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-268 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\ndecide its own political status and destiny. These three positions
\nwere in fact distinct from each other, but each has in effect some
\nrelation to the actually possible future of humanity. The first
\nbased itself upon the present conditions and aimed at a certain
\npractical rearrangement. The second tried to hasten into immediate practicability a not entirely remote possibility of the
\nfuture. The third aimed at bringing into precipitation by the
\nalchemy of revolution\u2014for what we inappropriately call revolution is only a rapidly concentrated movement of evolution\u2014a
\nyet remote end which, in the ordinary course of events, could
\nonly be realised, if at all, in the far distant future. All of them
\nhave to be considered; for a prospect which only takes into view
\nexisting realised forces or apparently realisable possibilities is
\nforedoomed to error. Moreover, the Russian idea by its attempt
\nat self-effectuation, however immediately ineffective, rendered
\nitself an actual force which must be counted among those that
\nmay influence the future of the race. A great idea already striving to enforce itself in the field of practice is a power which cannot be left out of count, nor valued only according to its apparent
\nchances of immediate effectuation at the present hour. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nThe position taken by England, France and Italy, the Western European section of the Allies, contemplated a political
\nrearrangement of the world, but not any radical change of its
\nexisting order. It is true that it announced the principle of free
\nnationalities; but in international politics which is still a play of
\nnatural forces and interests and in which ideals are only a comparatively recent development of the human mind, principles
\ncan only prevail where and so far as they are consonant with
\ninterests, or where and so far as, being hostile to interests, they
\nare yet assisted by natural forces strong enough to overbear these
\ninterests which oppose them. The pure application of ideals to
\npolitics is as yet a revolutionary method of action which can
\nonly be hoped for in exceptional crises; the day when it becomes
\na rule of life, human nature and life itself will have become a
\nnew phenomenon, something almost superterrestrial and divine.
\nThat day is not yet. The allied Powers in Europe were themselves nations with an imperial past and an imperial future; <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-269<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\n
\nthey could not, even if they wished, get away by the force of a
\nmere idea from that past and that future. Their first interests
\nand therefore the first duty of their statesmen, must be to preserve each its own empire, and even, where it can in their view
\nbe legitimately done, to increase it. The principle of free nationality could only be applied by them in its purity where their
\nown imperial interests were not affected, as against Turkey and
\nthe Central Powers, because there the principle was consonant
\nwith their own interests and could be supported as against German, Austrian or Turkish interests by the natural forces of a
\nsuccessful war which was or could be made to appear morally
\njustified in its result because it was invited by the Powers which
\nhad to suffer. It could not be applied in its purity where their
\nown imperial interests were affected, because there it was opposed to existing forces and there was no sufficient countervailing
\nforce by which that opposition could be counteracted. Here,
\ntherefore, it must be acted upon in a qualified sense, as a force
\nmoderating that of pure imperialism. So applied, it would amount
\nin fact at present to the concession of internal self-government
\nor Home Rule in such proportion, at such a time or by such
\nstages as might be possible, practicable and expedient for the interests of the empire and of the subject nation so far as they could
\nbe accommodated with one another. It must be understood, in
\nother words, as the common sense of the ordinary man would
\nunderstand it; it could not be and has nowhere been understood
\nin the sense which would be attached to it by the pure idealist of
\nthe Russian type who was careless of all but the naked purity of
\nhis principle. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nWhat, then, would be the practical consequences of this
\nqualified principle of free nationality as it would have been
\npossible to apply it after a complete victory of the Allied Powers,
\nits representatives? In America, it would have no field of immediate application. In Africa, there are not only no free nations,
\nbut with the exception of Egypt and Abyssinia, no nations,
\nproperly speaking; for Africa is the one part of the world where
\nthe old tribal conditions have still survived and only tribal peoples exist, not nations in the political sense of the word.
\nHere,<\/i> <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-270 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\n
\nthen, a complete victory of the Allies meant the partition of the
\ncontinent between three colonial Empires, Italy, France and England, with the continuance of the Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese enclaves and the precarious continuance for a time of the
\nAbyssinian kingdom. In Asia, it meant the appearance of three or
\nfour new nationalities out of the ruins of the Turkish empire; but these by their immaturity would all be foredoomed to remain, for a time at least, under the influence or the protection of
\none or other of the great Powers. In Europe, it implied the diminution of Germany by the loss of Alsace and Poland, the disintegration of the Austrian empire, the reversion of the Adriatic
\ncoast to Serbia and Italy, the liberation of the Czech and Polish
\nnations, some rearrangement in the Balkan Peninsula and the
\nadjacent countries. All this, it is clear, meant a great change in
\nthe map of the world, but no radical transformation. The existing tendency of nationalism would gain some extension by the
\ncreation of a number of new independent nations; the existing
\ntendency of imperial aggregation would gain a far greater extension by the expansion of the actual territory, world-wide influence and international responsibilities of the successful empires. <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nStill, certain very important results could not but be gained
\nwhich must make in the end for a free world-union. The most
\nimportant of these, the result of the Russian Revolution born
\nout of the war and its battle cry of free nationality but contingent
\non the success and maintenance of the revolutionary principle,
\nwas the disappearance of Russia as an aggressive empire and its
\ntransformation from an imperialistic aggregate into a congeries
\nor a federation of free republics.* The second is the destruction
\nof the German type of imperialism and the salvation of a number
\nof independent nationalities which lay under its menace. The
\nthird is the multiplication of distinct nationalities with a claim
\nto the recognition of their separate existence and legitimate voice
\nin the affairs of the world, which makes for the strengthening of
\nthe idea of a free world-union as the ultimate solution of international problems. The fourth is the definite recognition by the <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\n* Not so free in practice under Bolshevik rule as in principle; but still the
\nprinciple is there and capable of development in a freer future. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-271<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nBritish nation of the qualified principle of free nationality in
\nthe inevitable reorganisation of the empire. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nThis development took two forms, the recognition of the
\nprinciple of Home Rule in Ireland and India and the recognition of the claim of each constituent nation to a voice, which in
\nthe event of Home Rule* must mean a free and equal voice, in
\nthe councils of the Empire. Taken together, these things would
\nmean the ultimate conversion from an empire constituted on
\nthe old principle of nationalistic imperialism which was represented by the supreme government of one predominant nation,
\nEngland, into a free and equal commonwealth of nations managing their common affairs through a supple co-ordination by mutual goodwill and agreement. In other words, such a development
\ncould mean in the end the application within certain limits of
\nprecisely that principle which would underlie the constitution,
\non the larger scale, of a free world-union. Much work would
\nhave to be done, several extensions made, many counterforces
\novercome before such a commonwealth could become a realised
\nfact, but that it should have taken shape in the principle and
\nin the germ, constitutes a notable event in world-history. Two
\nquestions remained for the future. What would be the effect of
\nthis experiment on the other empires which adhere to the old
\nprinciple of a dominant centralisation? Probably it would have
\nthis effect, if it succeeded, that, as they are faced by the growth
\nof strong nationalistic movements, they may be led to adopt the
\nsame or a similar solution, just as they adopted from England
\nwith modifications her successful system of Parliamentary government<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\n* Now called Dominion Status. Unfortunately, this recognition could
\nnot be put into force except after a violent struggle in Ireland and was marred
\nby the partition of the country. After a vehement passive resistance in India
\nit came to be recognised in India but in a truncated form shifting the full
\nconcession to a far future. In Egypt also it was only after a struggle that freedom was given but subject to a controlling British alliance. Still the nationalistic principle worked in the creation of a free Iraq, the creation of Arab
\nkingdom and Syrian republics, the withdrawal of imperialistic influence from
\nPersia and, above all, in the institution of Dominion Status substituting an internally free and equal position in a commonwealth of peoples, for a dominating
\nEmpire. Yet these results, however imperfect, prepared the greater fulfilments
\nwhich we now see accomplished as part of a new world of free peoples. <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-272 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nin the affairs of the nation. Secondly, what of the relation between these empires and the many independent non-imperial nations or republics which would exist under the new
\narrangement of the world? How are they to be preserved from
\nfresh attempts to extend the imperial idea, or how is their existence to be correlated in the international comity with the huge
\nand overshadowing power of the empires. It is here that the
\nAmerican idea of the League of Free Nations intervened and
\nfound a justification in principle. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nUnfortunately, it was always difficult to know what exactly
\nthis idea would mean in practice. The utterances of its original
\nspokesman. President Wilson, were marked by a magnificent
\nnebulous idealism full of inspiring ideas and phrases but not
\nattended by a clear and specific application. For the idea behind
\nthe head of the President we must look for light to the past history and the traditional temperament of the American people.
\nThe United States were always pacific and non-imperialistic
\nin sentiment and principle, yet with an undertone of nationalistic susceptibility which threatened recently to take an imperialistic turn and led the nation to make two or three wars ending
\nin conquests whose results it had then to reconcile with its non-imperialistic pacifism. It annexed Mexican Texas by war and
\nthen turned it into a constituent State of the union, swamping
\nit at the same time with American colonists. It conquered Cuba
\nfrom Spain and the Philippines first from Spain and then from
\nthe insurgent Filipinos and, not being able to swamp them with
\ncolonists, gave Cuba independence under the American influence
\nand promised the Filipinos a complete independence. American
\nidealism was always governed by a shrewd sense of American
\ninterests, and highest among these interests is reckoned the preservation of the American political idea and its constitution, to
\nwhich all imperialism, foreign or American, has to be regarded
\nas a mortal peril. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nAs a result and as the result of Its inevitable amalgamation
\nwith that much more qualified aim of the Allied Powers a League of Nations was bound to have both an opportunist and idealistic <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-273 <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nelement. The opportunist element was bound to take in its first
\nform the legalisation of the map and political formation of the
\nworld as it emerged from the convulsion of the war. Its idealistic
\nside, if supported by the use of the influence of America in the
\nLeague, would favour the increasing application of the democratic principle in its working and its result might be the final
\nemergence of a United States of the world with a democratic
\nCongress of the nations as its governing agency. The legalisation
\nmight have the good effect of minimising the chances of war, if
\na real League of Nations proved practicable and succeeded,\u2014
\neven under the best conditions by no means a foregone conclusion.* But it would have the bad effect of tending to stereotype
\na state of things which must be in part artificial, irregular,
\nanomalous and only temporarily useful. Law is necessary for
\norder and stability, but it becomes a conservative and hampering
\nforce unless it provides itself with an effective machinery for
\nchanging the laws as soon as circumstances and new needs make
\nthat desirable. This can only happen if a true Parliament,
\nCongress or free Council of the nations becomes an accomplished
\nthing. Meanwhile, how is the added force for the conservation
\nof old principles to be counteracted and an evolution assured
\nwhich will lead to the consummation desired by the democratic
\nAmerican ideal? America’s pressure and influence in such a
\nLeague would not be sufficient for the purpose; for it would
\nhave at its side other influences interested in preserving the
\nstatus quo<\/i> and some interested in developing the imperialistic
\nsolution. Another force, another influence would be needed.
\nHere the Russian ideal, if truly applied and made a power, could
\nintervene and find its justification. For our purpose, it would
\nbe the most interesting and important of the three anti-imperialistic influences which Nature might throw as elements into her
\ngreat crucible to reshape the human earth-mass for a yet unforeseen purpose. <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n*The League was eventually formed with America outside it and as an
\ninstrument of European diplomacy which was a had omen for its future. <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nPage-274 <\/font><\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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