{"id":3144,"date":"2013-07-13T01:46:17","date_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:46:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/?p=3144"},"modified":"2013-07-13T01:46:17","modified_gmt":"2013-07-13T01:46:17","slug":"32-the-principle-of-free-confederation-vol-the-ideal-of-human-unity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/01-works-of-sri-aurobindo\/02-other-editions\/the-ideal-of-human-unity\/32-the-principle-of-free-confederation-vol-the-ideal-of-human-unity","title":{"rendered":"-32_The Principle of Free Confederation.htm"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\n\n
\n

\nCHAPTER XXX <\/font>
\n<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\nTHE PRINCIPLE OF FREE CONFEDERATION<\/b><\/font>
\n<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\nT<\/font>HE
\n<\/font>issues of the original Russian idea of a confederation of free self-determining nationalities were greatly complicated by the transitory phenomena of a revolution which has
\nsought, like the French Revolution before it, to transform immediately and without easy intermediate stages the whole basis
\nnot only of government, but of society, and has, moreover, been
\ncarried out under pressure of a disastrous war. This double situation led inevitably to an unexampled anarchy and, incidentally,
\nto the forceful domination of an extreme party which represented the ideas of the Revolution in their most uncompromising
\nand violent form. The Bolshevik despotism corresponds in this
\nrespect to the Jacobin despotism of the French Reign of Terror.
\nThe latter lasted long enough to secure its work, which was to
\neffect violently and irrevocably the transition from the post-feudal system of society to the first middle-class basis of democratic development. The Labourite despotism in Russia, the rule
\nof the Soviets, fixing its hold and lasting long enough, could
\neffect the transition of society to a second and more advanced
\nbasis of the same or even to a still farther development. But we
\nare concerned only with the effect on the ideal of free nationality. On this point, all Russia, except the small reactionary party,
\nwas from the first agreed; but the resort to the principle of
\ngovernment by force brought in a contradictory element which
\nendangered its sound effectuation even in Russia itself and therefore weakened the force which it might have had in the immediate <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-275<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nfuture of the world-development.* For it stands on a
\nmoral principle which belongs to the future; while government
\nof other nations by force belongs to the past and present and
\nis radically inconsistent with the founding of the new world-arrangement on the basis of free choice and free status. It must
\ntherefore be considered in itself apart from any application now
\nreceived, which must necessarily be curbed and imperfect. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nThe political arrangement of the world hitherto has rested
\non an almost entirely physical and vital, that is to say, geographical, commercial, political and military basis. Both the nation
\nidea and the State idea have been built and have worked on this
\nfoundation. The first unity aimed at has been a geographical,
\ncommercial, political and military union, and in establishing this
\nunity, the earlier vital principle of race on which the clan and
\ntribe were founded, has been everywhere overridden. It is true
\nthat nationhood still founds itself largely on the idea of race, but
\nthis is in the nature of a fiction. It covers the historical fact of
\na fusion of many races and attributes a natural motive to a historical and geographical association. Nationhood founds itself
\npartly on this association, partly on others which accentuate it,
\ncommon interests, community of language, community of culture
\nand all these in unison have evolved a psychological idea, a psychological unity, which finds expression in the idea of nationalism. But the nation idea and the State idea do not everywhere
\ncoincide, and in most cases the former has been overridden by
\nthe latter, and always on the same physical and vital grounds\u2013grounds of geographical, political and military necessity or convenience. In the conflict between the two, force, as in all vital
\nand physical struggle, must always be the final arbiter. But the
\nnew principle proposed,<\/font>\u2020<\/font> that of the right of every natural grouping which feels its own separateness to choose its own status and <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\n* The component states of socialistic Russia are allowed a certain cultural,
\nlinguistic and other autonomy, but the rest is illusory as they are in fact governed by the force of a highly centralised autocracy in Moscow. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n\u2020This principle was recognised in theory by the Allies under the name
\nof self-determination but, needless to say, it has been disregarded as soon as
\nthe cry had served its turn. <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-276<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\n
\npartnerships, makes a clean sweep of these vital and physical
\ngrounds and substitutes a purely psychological principle of free
\nwill and free choice as against the claims of political and economic necessity. <\/b> Or rather the vital and physical grounds of
\ngrouping are only to be held valid when they receive this psychological sanction and are to found themselves upon it. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nHow the two rival principles work out can be seen by the
\nexample of Russia itself which is now prominently before our
\neyes. Russia has never been a nation-State in the pure sense of
\nthe word, like France, Spain, Italy, Great Britain or modem
\nGermany; it has been a congeries of nations, Great Russia, Ruthenian Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania, Poland, Siberia, all
\nSlavic with a dash of Tartar and German blood, Courland which
\nis mostly Slav but partly German, Finland which has no community of any kind with the rest of Russia, and latterly the
\nAsiatic nations of Turkestan, all bound together by one bond
\nonly, the rule of the Tsar. The only psychological justification
\nof such a union was the future possibility of fusion into a single
\nnation with the Russian language as its instrument of culture,
\nthought and government, and it was this which the old Russian
\nregime had in view. The only way to bring this about was by
\ngovernmental force, the way that had been long attempted by England in Ireland and was attempted by Germany in German Poland
\nand Lorraine. The Austrian method of federation employed with
\nHungary as a second partner or of a pressure tempered by leniency, by concessions and by measures of administrative half-autonomy might have been tried, but their success in Austria
\nhas been small. Federation has not as yet proved a successful
\nprinciple except between States and nations or sub-nations already disposed to unite by ties of common culture, a common
\npast or an already developed or developing sense of common
\nnationhood; such conditions existed in the American States and
\nin Germany and they exist in China and in India, but they have
\nnot existed in Austria or Russia. Or, if things and ideas had been
\nripe, instead of this attempt, there might have been an endeavour
\nto found a free union of nations with the Tsar as the symbol of a <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-277<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nsupra-national idea and bond of unity; but for this the movement
\nof the world was not yet ready. Against an obstinate psychological
\nresistance the vital and physical motive of union could only
\nresort to force military, administrative and political, which has
\nsucceeded often enough in the past. In Russia, it was probably
\non the way to a slow success as far as the Slavic portions of the
\nEmpire were concerned; in Finland, perhaps also in Poland, it
\nwould probably have failed much more irretrievably than the
\nlong reign of force failed in Ireland, partly because even a Russian or a German autocracy cannot apply perfectly and simply
\nthe large, thorough-going and utterly brutal and predatory methods of a Cromwell or Elizabeth,* partly because the resisting
\npsychological factor of nationalism had become too self-conscious
\nand capable of an organised passive resistance or at least a passive
\nforce of survival. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nBut if the psychological justification was deficient or only
\nin process of creation, the vital and physical case for a strictly
\nunited Russia, not excluding Finland, was overwhelming. The
\nwork of the Peters and Catherines was founded on a strong political, military and economic necessity. From the political and
\nmilitary point of view, all these Slavic nations had everything to
\nlose by disunion, because, disunited, they were each exposed
\nand they exposed each other to the oppressive contact of any
\npowerful neighbour, Sweden, Turkey, Poland, while Poland
\nwas a hostile and powerful State, or Germany and Austria. The
\nunion of the Ukraine Cossacks with Russia was indeed brought
\nabout by mutual agreement as a measure of defence against
\nPoland. Poland itself, once weakened, stood a better chance by
\nbeing united with Russia than by standing helpless and alone
\nbetween three large and powerful neighbours, and her total inclusion would certainly have been a better solution for her than
\nthe fatal partition between three hungry powers. On the other <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\n* This could no longer be said after the revival of mediaeval barbaric
\ncruelty in Nazi Germany, one of the most striking recent developments of
\n"modern" humanity. But this may be regarded perhaps as a temporary back
\nsliding, though it sheds lurid lights on the still existing darker possibilities of
\nhuman nature. <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-278<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nhand, by union a State was created, so geographically compact,
\nyet so large in bulk, numerous in population, well defended
\n<\/b>by
\n<\/b>natural conditions and rich in potential resources that, if it
\nhad been properly organised, it could not only have stood secure
\nin itself, but dominated half Asia, as it already does, and half
\nEurope, as it was once, even without proper organisation and
\ndevelopment, almost on the way to do, when it interfered as
\narmed arbiter, here deliverer, there champion of oppression in
\nAustro-Hungary and in the Balkans. Even the assimilation of
\nFinland was justified from this point of view; for a free Finland
\nwould have left Russia geographically and economically incomplete and beset and limited in her narrow Baltic outlet, while
\na Finland dominated by a strong Sweden or a powerful Germany
\nwould have been a standing military menace to the Russian
\ncapital and the Russian empire. The inclusion of Finland, on
\nthe contrary, made Russia secure, at ease and powerful at this
\nvital point. Nor, might it be argued, did Finland herself really
\nlose, since, independent, she would be too small and weak to
\nmaintain herself against neighbouring imperial aggressiveness
\nand must rely on the support of Russia. All these advantages
\nhave been destroyed, temporarily, at least, by the centrifugal
\nforces let loose by the Revolution and its principle of the free
\nchoice of nationalities. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nIt is evident that these arguments, founded as they are on
\nvital and physical necessity and regardless of moral and psychological justification, might be carried very far. They would not
\nonly justify Austria’s now past domination of Trieste and her
\nSlavic territories, as they justified England’s conquest and holding of Ireland against the continued resistance of the Irish people, but also, extended a little farther, Germany’s schemes of
\nPan-Germanism and even her larger ideas of absorption and expansion. It could be extended to validate all that imperial expansion of the European nations which has now no moral justification and could only have been justified morally in the future by
\nthe creation of supra-national psychological unities; for the vital
\nand physical grounds always exist. Even the moral, at least the <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-279<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\npsychological and cultural justification of a unified Russian culture and life in process of creation, could be extended, and the
\nEuropean claim to spread and universalise European civilisation
\nby annexation and governmental force presents on its larger
\nscale a certain moral analogy. This, too, extended, might justify
\nthe pre-war German ideal of a sort of unification of the world
\nunder the aegis of German power and German culture. But however liable to abuse by extension, vital necessity must be allowed
\na word in a world still dominated fundamentally by the law of
\nforce, however mitigated in its application, and by vital and
\nphysical necessity, so far at least as concerns natural geographical unities like Russia, the United Kingdom,* even Austria
\nwithin its natural frontiers.\u2020<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nThe Russian principle belongs, in fact, to a possible future
\nin which moral and psychological principles will have a real
\nchance to dominate, and vital and physical necessities will have
\nto suit themselves to them, instead of, as now, the other way
\nround; it belongs to an arrangement of things that would be the
\nexact reverse of the present international system. As things are
\nat present, it has to struggle against difficulties which may well
\nbe insuperable. The Russians were much ridiculed and more
\nvilified for their offer of a democratic peace founded on the free
\nchoice of nations to autocratic and militarist Germany bent on
\nexpansion like other empires by dishonest diplomacy and by the
\nsword. From the point of view of practical statesmanship the
\nridicule was justified; for the offer ignored facts and forces and
\nfounded itself on the power of the naked and unarmed idea.
\nThe Russians, thorough-going idealists, acted, in fact, in the
\nsame spirit as did once the French in the first fervour of their
\nrevolutionary enthusiasm; they offered their new principle of
\nliberty and democratic peace to the world,\u2014not, at first, to <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\n* Now we must say Great Britain and Ireland, for the United Kingdom
\nexists no longer. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n\u2020 Note from this point of view the disastrous economic results of the
\nbreaking up of the Austrian empire in the small nations that <\/b> have arisen
\n<\/b>in
\n<\/b>its place. <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-280<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\n
\nGermany alone,\u2014in the hope that its moral beauty and truth and
\ninspiration would compel acceptance, not by the Governments
\nbut by the peoples who would force the hands of the governments or overturn them if they opposed. Like the French Revolutionists, they found that ours is still a world in which ideals
\ncan only be imposed if they have a preponderating vital and
\nphysical force in their hands or at their backs. The French Jacobins with their ideal of unitarian nationalism were able to concentrate their energies and make their principle triumph for a
\ntime by force of arms against a hostile world. The Russian
\nidealists found in their attempt to effectuate their principle that
\nthe principle itself was the source of weakness; they found themselves helpless against the hard-headed German cynicism, not
\nbecause they were disorganised,\u2014for revolutionary France was
\nalso disorganised and overcame the difficulty,\u2014but because the
\ndissolution of the old Russian fabric to which they had consented deprived them of the means of united and organised
\naction. Nevertheless, their principle was a more advanced, because a moral principle, than the aggressive nationalism which
\nwas all the international result of the French Revolution; it has
\na greater meaning for the future. <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\nFor it belongs to a future of free world-union in which
\nprecisely this principle of free self-determination must be either
\nthe preliminary movement or the main final result, to an arrangement of things in which the world will have done with war and
\nforce as the ultimate basis of national and international relations and be ready to adopt free agreement as a substitute. If the
\nidea could work itself out, even if only within the bounds of
\nRussia,* and arrive at some principle of common action, even
\nat the cost of that aggressive force which national centralisation
\ncan alone give, it would mean a new moral power in the world.
\nIt would certainly not be accepted elsewhere, except in case of
\nunexpected revolutions, without enormous reserves and qualifications;<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n <\/p>\n

\n
\n* The idea was sincere at the time, but it has lost its significance because
\nof the principle of revolutionary force on which Sovietism still rests. <\/font>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-281<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\nbut it would be there working as a power to make the
\nworld ready for itself and, when it is ready, would play a large
\ndetermining part in the final arrangement of human unity. But
\neven if it fails entirely in its present push for realisation, it will
\nstill have its part to play in a better prepared future. <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

\n Page-282<\/font><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CHAPTER XXX   THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE CONFEDERATION   THE issues of the original Russian idea of a confederation of free self-determining nationalities were greatly…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[63],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3144","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-the-ideal-of-human-unity","wpcat-63-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3144","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3144"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3144\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3144"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3144"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worksofthemotherandsriaurobindo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3144"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}