The Hughly Conference

THE chances of politics are in reality the hidden guidance of a Power whose workings do not reveal themselves easily even to the most practised eye. It is difficult therefore to say whether the successful conclusion of the Provincial Conference at Hughly without the often threatened breach between the parties, will really result in the furtherance of the object for which the Nationalists consented to waive the reaffirmation of the policy formulated at Pabna and refrained from using the preponderance which the general sentiment of the great majority of the delegates gave them at Hughly. If things go by the counting of heads, as is the rule in democratic politics, the Nationalist sentiment commands the greater part of Bengal. But in leaders of recognised weight, established reputation and political standing the party is necessarily inferior to the Moderates, both because it is a younger force very recently emerged and because its leaders have been scattered by a repression which has aimed at the tall heads of the party. There is also a large body of sentiment in the Mofussil which is Nationalist at heart but does not always venture to be Nationalist in action because of the difficulties in the way of the Nationalist programme and the respect due to the elder leaders. On the other hand among the young men who command the future, Moderatism is dead and what takes its place is a Nationalism which loves rather to act than to think, because it has not yet accustomed itself to the atmosphere of strenuous political thought. In fact the spirit of Nationalism and its objects are becoming universal but its methods, though preferred, are not always adhered to and its thought has not everywhere penetrated below the surface.

The possibility or otherwise of united action was the governing thought throughout the Conference. The tendency to break to pieces was very prominent in the first day's proceedings and was fostered by certain incidents slight in themselves but each of

which was in the existing state of feeling a quite possible pretext for disruption. It was from an observation of the proceedings of the first day that either party offered its programme of action for the second. The Nationalist Party intended to put forward a formal protest against any acceptance of the reforms in however slight a degree, to press the Pabna resolution on the Boycott and above all to insist on the Conference taking some definite step which would either materialise the chances of an United Congress or once for all show that union was impossible. The Moderate leaders came determined on four things, not to allow any resolution recognising general passive resistance, not to allow any resolution amounting to an absolute refusal of the Reforms, not to allow any resolution debarring delegates from Bengal from joining the Lahore Convention in case of that body rejecting union and not to consent even to the bringing forward of any amendment or proposal of a pronounced nationalist character in the Conference. On all these points it was made quite evident that if the Nationalists pressed their points the Conference would be broken up by the secession of the Moderate leaders. In all these disputed matters, therefore, the Nationalists gave way and adhered only to their main point of securing some definite step in relation to the holding of an united Congress.

It is necessary to explain this action on the part of our party, for in his speech on the Boycott resolution Sj. Aurobindo Ghose purposely refrained from stating more than the bare fact in order that nothing he might say should lead to excitement or anything which could be an excuse for friction. It is not that the Nationalist party is not willing or able to stand by itself if that proves inevitable and seems the best course in the interests of Nationalism and the future of the country. But it has always been the ideal of the Nationalists to make of the Congress a great and living body deliberative in the manner of free assemblies which consider from various points of view what is best for the country and decide by majority or, whenever possible, unanimously, the parties holding together not by identity of views but by one common aim and interest and the combined freedom and restraint of a constitution which provides for the free expression of opinion under fair and impartial rules. They seek also a centre for the

country's strength which can give authority to a network of organisation systematising the work of the nation. They seek in other words a centre of deliberation and a centre of order and authority which can take charge of national progress. To seek this centre outside the long established body to which the nation has looked as the pivot of its political activities would have been a waste of material already half-prepared for the purpose. In attempting to convert this instrument to its proper uses they may have committed errors of over-eagerness and passionate impatience, the ordinary faults of a party of progress still young and energetic, but the errors on the other side were yet greater. The errors of life and progress are more exuberant and striking but less fatal than the errors of decay and reaction. However that be, in the attempt the instrument itself was broken, but it is capable of being mended if the past errors on both sides can be got rid of, and it is the duty of the Nationalist Party to give a fair chance to the forces that make for the preservation of this old and honoured institution. This is the more incumbent on them as the sense of the country is in favour of an attempt to restore unity. A democratic party is bound to give the utmost weight to the general sense of the country in a matter of such primary importance.

It remains to be seen whether the great concessions made by the party will bear any fruit. The situation is not wholly encouraging. The position taken by the Moderate leaders that the Nationalists even if they are in a majority, must not try to enforce resolutions which travel beyond the limits of common agreement and unanimity and must allow resolutions to pass which are contrary to their principle and policy on pain of a Moderate secession may be tolerated for some time; but how long can a growing sentiment and ideal representing the future consent to be restrained within such iron limits ? And if such be the basis of union proposed, it is obvious that the Congress will  be an united Congress only in name and the attendance of the Nationalists perfunctory or useless. If on the other hand the resolutions of the Congress are recognised as the opinion of the majority leaving the minority perfect freedom to bring in their own  resolutions when they have concerted the mass of public opinion

to their views, the unity will be real and living. We were never in favour of shams. It is only righteousness that exalts a nation and righteousness means going straight; nothing can long endure which is based upon unreality and hollowness. If therefore there is any union it must be one which recognises that there are two parties in the country and that each has a right not only to exist but to make itself felt. This is a right we have not refused to the Moderate Party when we were in the majority: if they refuse it to us, then the talk of unity must cease and Sir Pherozshah Mehta and Mr. Gokhale must have their way.

This is the position from the Nationalist point of view. We hope that the largeness of the sacrifice made will not, in view of the slightness of the chance in favour of which everything else was thrown overboard, create any dissatisfaction in the party. All shades of Nationalist opinion were represented at Hughly and they consented to be guided in the matter by Srijut Aurobindo Ghose on whom the responsibility of leadership fell in the absence of older colleagues who have been temporarily or permanently removed from the field. The Nationalist Party is a practical possession of the heart and mind of Bengal. It is strongly supported in other parts of India and controls Maharashtra. It is growing in strength, energy and wisdom. It surely inherits the future. Under such circumstances it can afford to wait.

HOME